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Constructing quality argumentation to justify one’s own beliefs on a topic is 
important both for a thorough topic understanding and the development of argumentation 
writing skills. Also, one’s change or retention of topic beliefs should be based on quality 
argumentation, such that the belief can be considered rational. The purpose of this study 
was to test whether a cognitive strategy, elaborative interrogation, can improve the 
understanding of belief-inconsistent arguments on a controversial topic and then improve 
argumentation quality, as well as result in reflective belief change. Elaborative 
interrogation is a cognitive strategy which prompts individuals to answer “why” 
questions on the to-be-learned information. The present study also examined the role of 
individuals’ need for cognition in argumentation and its role in the relationship between 
using elaborative interrogation and quality of argumentation.  
This study used a mixed model pretest-posttest experimental design with random 
assignment to three experimental conditions (elaborative interrogation treatment 
condition, summary control condition, and no-processing control condition) to test three 
hypotheses on effects of elaborative interrogation and need for cognition. It was 
hypothesized individuals who used elaborative interrogation strategy when reading 
 belief-inconsistent arguments would demonstrate improvement in quality of 
argumentation (Hypothesis 1) and reflective belief change (Hypothesis 2) after reading, 
whereas individuals who did not use this strategy would not. Argumentation quality and 
topic beliefs were measured before and after the experimental manipulation to examine 
pre-post changes, if any. It was also hypothesized high need for cognition would be 
associated with high quality of argumentation (Hypothesis 3). Based on the experimental 
results, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were confirmed. Hypothesis 3 was rejected. 
In the end, implications of the findings about each hypothesis are discussed, along 
with possible cognitive mechanisms underlying these findings. Contributions of this 
study also are summarized, highlighting the connection between the psychology literature 
on cognitive biases and the education literature on learning strategies. Finally, limitations 
of the study are discussed, followed by suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Within the last decade, interest in argumentation has grown in the field of 
educational studies, with researchers examining argumentation from a number of 
different perspectives. One prominent emphasis has been to test whether certain 
interventions (e.g., goal instruction, use of graphic organizers and critical questions) 
improve the process of argumentation (e.g., Golanics & Nussbaum, 2008; Nussbaum, 
2005; Nussbaum & Edwards, 2011; Nussbaum & Schraw, 2007). Studies have also been 
conducted on how students’ individual differences affect the way they approach 
argumentation (Nussbaum, 2002; Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003) and how argumentation 
can be utilized as an instructional technique conducive to content learning. (Nussbaum & 
Sinatra, 2003; Nussbaum, Sinatra, & Poliquin, 2008).  
Most intervention studies on argumentation quality have used controversial topics 
as prompts for argumentation. Since a controversial topic usually involves complicated 
phenomena that are difficult to address empirically in a straightforward manner, 
arguments typically are proposed in such studies and made readily available for both 
sides of the controversy on the topic. In these studies, the quality of argumentation has 
most often been assessed with regard to how well individuals integrate arguments 
supporting their own stances on a topic with arguments contrary to their stances. 
Researchers seem to agree being able to coordinate supporting arguments and refuting 
arguments is essential to the construction of good argumentation and to the evaluation of 
arguments. 
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In the process of constructing argumentation to justify their own stances on the 
topic, however, individuals may integrate arguments supporting their stances and those 
refuting their stances at a surface level, or do so in a flawed manner. For instance, they 
may lack a sufficient understanding of an argument contrary to their stances and thus fail 
in constructing a valid rebuttal to it. They may also distort the meaning of such an 
argument thus making it easy to refute. In particular, if individuals already hold certain 
beliefs or take a side on the controversial topic prior to the integration of supporting and 
refuting arguments, argumentations they construct on the topic may be biased by their 
pre-existing beliefs or positions.  
In the present study, argumentation was viewed as the cognitive foundation of 
individuals’ positions and beliefs on a controversial topic. In other words, in the process 
of constructing argumentation, individuals engage in examining and articulating their 
beliefs on the topic. If provided with belief-inconsistent arguments on the topic, they may 
also engage in comprehending and evaluating these arguments. It is possible individuals’ 
elaboration on their stances on a controversial topic will be affected by their 
understanding and evaluation of belief-inconsistent arguments. If their argumentations 
are constructed based on deep and unbiased information processing of belief-inconsistent 
arguments, it is likely their argumentations have sufficient validity as a cognitive basis 
for reflective belief change or belief retention.  
This study examined whether a cognitive strategy could be used to remedy 
shallow and/or biased processing of belief-inconsistent arguments on a controversial 
topic such that argumentation could be improved after reading. Also, since argumentation 
may serve as the cognitive basis of the formation, change, and retention of individuals’ 
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beliefs on a controversial topic (Kuhn, 1992, 1993), an understanding of arguments 
contrary to existing beliefs may affect the topic beliefs after reading. In particular, deep 
and unbiased processing of arguments refuting individuals’ existing beliefs on the topic 
may change individuals’ beliefs such that a more integrated and less extreme view is 
formed. Individual differences in cognitive motivation may also affect quality of 
argumentation and how well individuals react to the cognitive strategy for improving 
argumentation.  
Quality of Argumentation and Belief-Inconsistent Arguments 
Quality argumentation in both individual and social settings entails justifying and 
elaborating one’s own position, as well as representing, understanding and responding to 
counterarguments. In educational settings, creating an argument can be either a solitary or 
social activity (Kuhn, 1991). When an argument is constructed solitarily (a rhetorical 
argument in Kuhn’s sense, p. 12, 1991), one makes a claim on a topic and provides 
reasons and evidence to support it. The belief elaborated by reasons and evidence in the 
argument usually has competing alternatives. Therefore, a convincing argument in favor 
of one belief involves addressing other beliefs contrary to it. Without an account of 
alternative beliefs, an argument becomes fragile and even superfluous. When an 
argument is constructed in conversation with others (dialogic argument in Kuhn’s sense), 
one is obligated to defend it against challenges and refutations from others holding 
competing beliefs by engaging in a debate. Without an integration of argument, 
counterargument, and rebuttal, such debate would be reduced to isolated presentations of 
competing beliefs without genuine communication between people taking two sides of 
the issue.  
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The technological age makes vast amounts of information available to students 
through various media, thus one can easily access arguments from various perspectives 
on a controversial topic. However, biased information processing may render the task of 
representing and understanding competing arguments challenging. Once individuals have 
decided to take certain positions on a controversial topic by holding some beliefs instead 
of others, the tendency of confirmation bias can result in ignorance or distortion of 
alternative beliefs and arguments supporting these beliefs (Arkes, 1991). Since quality 
argumentation entails integration of arguments and counterarguments, however, a 
sufficient and accurate understanding of arguments inconsistent with one’s position may 
help one defend one’s position on a topic with valid and convincing argumentation. 
Therefore, deep and objective processing of belief-inconsistent arguments is likely 
essential to the improvement of argumentation quality. The aim of this research was to 
test a cognitive strategy designed to improve argumentation by facilitating deep and 
unbiased processing of belief-inconsistent arguments. 
Confirmation Bias and Its Cognitive Remedy 
Confirmation bias is a generic term used to refer to a collection of different biases 
demonstrated in human reasoning. Although these biases can take various forms and have 
been demonstrated in a variety of task contexts, they all result in seeking or interpreting 
evidence in a way that confirms existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998), rather than using the 
evidence to objectively examine the truthfulness of existing beliefs. Although a thorough 
explanation of the phenomenon of confirmation bias in all circumstances may involve 
both cognitive and motivational accounts (Kunda, 1990), three aspects of cognition 
appear to be critical to overcoming confirmation bias demonstrated in reasoning tasks 
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such as argumentation construction. First, individuals should understand the right way to 
show a hypothesis to be true is trying to falsify it, rather than trying to confirm it 
(Nickerson, 1998). Second, individuals should be able to represent beliefs/claims 
separately from evidence/reason for an assessment of whether the evidence/reasons have 
bearings on the beliefs/claims. Third, individuals should possess knowledge of formal 
logic and/or knowledge of probabilistic rules to reason soundly. Thus, an effective 
cognitive remedy to confirmation bias against belief-inconsistent arguments should be 
designed to improve one, some, or all of these three aspects of cognition.  
Decades of psychological research on debiasing strategies has identified and 
tested a number of different cognitive strategies which can be utilized to correct 
reasoning flaws in judgment and decision making tasks in various contexts. Two of the 
most prominent of these are the “consider the opposite” approach and the “rule 
instruction” approach. The first approach is based on a questioning strategy which 
prompts individuals to reflect on possible reasons why their initial judgment or belief 
may be wrong. The second approach is based on explicit instruction on formal logic or 
probabilistic rules to improve reasoning performance (see Larrick, 2004).  
Although the plausibility of these two approaches might appear to be self-evident, 
empirical studies have provided mixed evidence on their effectiveness. The “consider the 
opposite” approach, as reviewed by Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, and Yoon (2007), often 
fails to improve rational judgment because participants experience difficulty in 
generating belief-inconsistent alternatives and reasons. Schwarz et al. argue that such 
perceived difficulty may result in strengthening of the original belief, rather than 
weakening of it. In other words, the metacognitive experience of heavy cognitive load 
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imposed by producing belief-inconsistent content can actually “backfire” by making 
individuals less likely to consider such content.  
As to the second approach—explicit verbal instruction of logical or statistical 
rules —its effects on reasoning performance have been found to be either mixed or 
limited (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, Pollard, 1994). It is possible confirmation bias in 
part results from automatic processing such that individuals subject to confirmation bias 
are not aware of it. Therefore, it would seem the design of a cognitive strategy as a 
remedy for belief-based confirmation bias should consider (1) cognitive load induced by 
considering alternatives and (2) automatic processing that cannot be effectively overcome 
by explicit instruction.  
Elaborative Interrogation as a Potential Remedy to Confirmation Bias 
In the field of educational psychology, studies of learning strategies most 
generally have been motivated by a need for finding approaches that facilitate 
information processing for the purpose of content comprehension and retention. Among 
other strategies, elaborative interrogation particularly has been viewed as holding 
promise as a way of overcoming belief-based confirmation bias by facilitating deep 
processing of belief-inconsistent content.  
Elaborative interrogation entails prompting learners to answer “why” questions on 
to-be-learned content, and has been found to be an effective strategy for improving 
learning of factual information (e.g., Pressley, Symons, McDaniel, Synder, & Turnure, 
1988; Seifert, 1993; Willoughby, Waller, Wood, & MacKinnon, 1993; Woloshyn, Paivio, 
& Pressley, 1994). It also has been shown to be especially useful for associative-typed 
learning (e.g., Woloshyn, Willoughby, Wood, & Pressley, 1990), with elaborative 
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interrogation questions improving performance on matching tests with large effect sizes. 
More recently, research has revealed  elaborative interrogation is also effective for 
improving inferential learning (e.g., Hannon & Daneman, 1998; Ozgungor & Guthrie, 
2004; Paris & Glynn, 2004).  
In the current research, elaborative interrogation strategies were adapted to make 
them more likely to serve as an effective remedy to confirmation bias against belief-
inconsistent arguments. Specifically, an adapted elaborative interrogation intervention 
was designed to facilitate (1) representation of claims and evidence/reasons separate from 
each other; and (2) deep processing of associations between claims and the corresponding 
evidence/reasons. Such strategy intervention was judged to have the potential for 
improving argumentation that justifies one’s position on a controversial topic after 
reading belief-inconsistent argument, as well as increasing the likelihood of topic belief 
change in less extreme and more balanced directions. These effects were considered 
likely because the adapted elaborative interrogation were judged as having the potential 
for improving the learning of belief-inconsistent arguments by combating confirmation 
bias against such arguments. Based on individuals’ greater understanding of belief 
inconsistent arguments, they could be expected to better elaborate on their topic positions 
and beliefs. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of literature on elaborative interrogation 
and confirmation bias by examining and connecting mechanisms of each.  
The Role of Learners’ Cognitive Motivation: Need for Cognition 
 In addition to the nature of materials and strategy intervention, students’ 
individual differences in cognitive motivation may also be important in relation to the 
processes and outcomes of argumentation. Among such differences, students’ need for 
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cognition—which has been shown to affect argumentation (e.g., Kardash & Scholes, 
1996; Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003)—may be an important variable to examine.  
The concept of need for cognition was first proposed by Cacioppo and Petty 
(1982) as a cognitive motivation construct and defined as “the tendency for an individual 
to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). Cacioppo and 
colleagues (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) then developed and 
refined the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) as a measure of this construct. Studies 
examining the psychometric quality of the NCS have provided evidence that it reflects a 
single dominant factor (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Moreover, as an 
index of “stable intrinsic motivation” (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, p. 199) rather 
than a true need, need for cognition is both conceptually and empirically distinguished 
from constructs such as need for structure and need for closure. 
In formulating their elaboration likelihood model, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) 
integrated need for cognition as a factor affecting processes and outcomes of persuasion. 
They portrayed need for cognition as a motivation to understand and construct meaning 
out of one’s experiences. According to their model, individuals high in need for cognition 
are more likely to acknowledge the true validity of an argument as well as to detect the 
true defect of it, regardless of their own beliefs. In general, individuals high in need for 
cognition are more likely to engage in deep information processing (e.g., Sadowski & 
Gulgoz, 1996). In specific relationship to argumentation, individuals high in need for 
cognition are seen as more likely to engage in social argument (e.g., Nussbaum & 
Bendixen, 2003), which usually consists of intellectually challenging situations.  
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Psychological research on need for cognition, as measured by the Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), has been quite 
extensive within the last 30 years. High need for cognition, for instance, has been found 
to be associated with high likelihood of processing information based on its true merits, 
which in turn leads to reflective belief formation/change and accurate learning outcomes 
(e.g., Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Mahoney & Kaufman, 1997; Nettelhorst & Youmans, 
2012; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Vidrine, Simmons, & Brandon, 2007). Thus, it seems 
probable need for cognition is related to individuals’ ability to construct argumentation 
for justifying their beliefs. Moreover, considering the likely effects of elaborative 
interrogation of facilitating deep information processing, need for cognition might 
interact with an elaborative interrogation experience in affecting individuals’ tendency to 
engage in deep processing of belief-inconsistent arguments and their ability to construct 
argumentation of high quality after reading such arguments.  
Research Questions 
The present research focused on an examination of the effectiveness of 
elaborative interrogation strategy for improving argumentation on a controversial topic 
after reading belief-inconsistent arguments, and also examined whether such a strategy 
can change individuals’ beliefs on the controversial topic toward a more balanced and 
less extreme direction. This research it further explored the effects of individuals’ need 
for cognition on quality of argumentation and whether need for cognition interacts with 
the use of elaborative interrogation. Three questions were addressed by this research:  
1.  Does answering elaborative interrogation questions when reading belief-
inconsistent arguments on a controversial topic improve quality of argumentation?  
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2.  Does answering elaborative interrogation questions when reading belief-
inconsistent arguments make participants’ topic beliefs more balanced and less 
extreme?  
3.  Do individuals with different levels of need for cognition demonstrate different 
quality of argumentation and do they benefit differentially from use of elaborative 
interrogation for an improvement of argumentation? 
Overview of Coming Chapters 
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature on the independent and dependent variables 
from the above research questions and their likely relationships. Chapter 2 also reviews 
two pilot studies and discusses methodological decisions on conducting the present 
research based on these results. Three research hypotheses are proposed following these 
reviews. Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the methods used in the research. 
Chapter 4 presents experimental results corresponding to each research hypothesis and 
results of some additional analyses. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the results, 
limitation of this study and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The current chapter contains a review of literature relevant to the proposed study. 
First, the most prominent current research paradigms on argumentation are examined, 
leading to a discussion of argumentation as a basis of knowledge and reflective belief 
change in education. In particular, the chapter discusses how the process of 
argumentation and the resultant belief outcomes on a controversial topic may be affected 
by confirmation bias when individuals are exposed to information contrary to their beliefs. 
Second, the chapter provides a review of the literature on elaborative interrogation, 
primarily focusing on the cognitive mechanisms underlying effects of elaborative 
interrogation on learning. Psychological studies on confirmation bias are then reviewed 
for analyses of its connections with elaborative interrogation. Based on these analyses, 
the potential of elaborative interrogation as a debiasing strategy for facilitating processing 
of belief-inconsistent arguments is then discussed. Third, the chapter provides a summary 
of relevant literature on need for cognition as a basis for an examination of how this 
cognitive motivation construct may affect argumentation quality and interact with use of 
elaborative interrogation. Finally, the chapter describes two pilot studies conducted by 
the present writer relevant to methodological approaches to be utilized in the proposed 
study.  
Paradigm of Argumentation Research 
Argumentation research published in the field of educational psychology 
generally is aligned with two major paradigms, which in the current study are referred to 
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as an argument for comprehension paradigm and a comprehension for argument 
paradigm (Nussbaum, 2008a).  
The argument for comprehension paradigm portrays argumentation as an 
instructional method to improve students’ understanding and retention of content 
knowledge (e.g., Asterhan & Schwarz, 2007; Nussbaum & Sinatra, 2003; see also a 
review by Nussbaum, 2008b, on argumentation as pedagogy). This research paradigm 
treats argumentation as an independent variable and is mainly represented by 
argumentation research in science learning. For example, Asterhan and Schwarz (2007) 
experimented on effects of argumentation on conceptual understanding of evolution 
theory as measured by inference-type essay questions. Nussbaum and Sinatra (2003) 
likewise examined the effects of argumentation on the outcome of conceptual change 
learning. They found participants asked to argue for alternative explanation of a physics 
problem tended to reason better than those who approached the problem without 
argumentation. Both studies documented positive effects of argumentation on learning 
outcome.  
In contrast, the comprehension for argument paradigm treats argumentation as a 
dependent variable and examines how skills of argument writing can be improved by 
strategies that solidify understanding of content specific to the argumentation topic. For 
example, Nussbaum (2008a) examined the effects of a graphic organizer on participants’ 
use of argumentation skills. The graphic organizer in his study was designed for 
comparing argument and counterargument on controversial educational topics (e.g., 
whether school should mandate wearing uniforms) side by side. His study identified a 
number of argumentation skills such as integration of two sides on a controversial topic, 
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as opposed to pseudo-integration (e.g. simply restating the counterarguments). Argument-
counterargument integration was found to be positively affected by training in use of the 
graphic organizer designed.  
The current study adopted a comprehension for argument paradigm. Specifically, 
the main purpose of this research was to examine whether a cognitive strategy designed 
to improve understanding of arguments inconsistent with individuals’ existing beliefs on 
a controversial topic can improve quality of argumentation constructed for justifying their 
positions on the topic.  
Argumentation as the Foundation of Knowledge and Decision Making 
As far as education is concerned, argumentation seems to play an important role 
in knowledge construction by representing the justifications on which individuals’ beliefs 
are based. If students acquire beliefs after being exposed to information transmitted from 
the external world but are unable to argue for these beliefs, it is likely they are not 
engaged in active knowledge construction, even though the beliefs acquired are true. In 
addition, reasoning skills can be practiced through argumentation, which then contributes 
to the development of rationality. Thus, being educated, at least in part, means learning to 
construct and change beliefs by constructing and examining arguments (Kuhn, 2005, p. 
178).  
Quality of argumentation may also affect decision-making outcomes. For example, 
Kuhn, Weinstock, and Flaton (1994) examined individuals’ reasoning processes and 
outcomes when they assumed the role of jurors. Participants in their study were asked to 
review evidence and videotapes of trials of a criminal case and to make decision about 
what verdict to choose. Kuhn et al. found two distinct modes of reasoning. The first is a 
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satisficing model, which some jurors deployed to generate a single story on “what 
happened” by drawing on some, but not other evidence. Although the story may have 
seemed plausible, there was evidence which could not be assimilated into the scenario of 
the story. In general, jurors endorsing a satisficing model ignored story-inconsistent 
evidence in order to keep the story unaffected and then chose a verdict which best 
matched the story. Other jurors reasoned based on a theory-evidence coordination model, 
in which they constructed multiple stories out of contradicting evidence. These jurors 
seemed to separately represent evidence versus stories. Since not all evidence fit with one 
story, the jurors had to evaluate each story by coordinating its supporting and opposing 
evidence as well as compare each story on the strength of supporting versus opposing 
evidence. The story evaluated as fitting best (but not perfectly) with available evidence 
was chosen and a verdict choice was then made.  
In contrast to jurors endorsing the satisficing model, those endorsing the theory-
evidence coordination model acknowledged the possibility of alternatives to the story 
they eventually chose. Also, jurors endorsing the theory-evidence coordination model 
construed the belief-independent status of evidence as containing truth in its own right 
without being incorporated into a pre-existing belief schema. In contrast, jurors endorsing 
the satisficing model simply considered consistent evidence as an integral part of the 
story they believed to be true and inconsistent evidence as “errors” (Kuhn et al., 1994), 
creating a biased argumentation. Thus, the theory-evidence coordination type reasoning 
represents a more rational process of argumentation, which is more complicated and 
objective than the satisficing type reasoning. Paradoxically, however, rational reasoners 
tend to be less certain about their beliefs as reasoning outcomes and readily acknowledge 
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the nature of beliefs as open to revision once new evidence is available (Kuhn, 1991). In 
the case of juror reasoning, jurors endorsing the theory-evidence coordination model also 
tended to hold less extreme views about what happened and therefore chose more 
moderate verdicts as compared with jurors endorsing the satisficing model.  
Argumentation and Confirmation Bias 
Definition and Research Paradigms of Confirmation Bias 
In spite of its importance to knowledge construction and decision making, optimal 
argumentation does not seem to be the norm in academic or other settings. Studies in 
psychology and other related domains have documented a great deal of evidence on 
flawed human thinking in a variety of cognitive tasks. One category of such human 
reasoning flaws is referred to as confirmation bias. Confirmation bias manifests itself in a 
variety of forms and under various task structures including formal and statistical 
reasoning, and informal reasoning such as social judgment and decision making. Arkes 
(1991) defined confirmation bias as “…a selective search, recollection, or assimilation of 
information in a way that lends spurious support to a hypothesis under consideration.”(p. 
489) Similarly, Nickerson (1998) defined confirmation bias as “…the seeking or 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a 
hypothesis in hand” (p. 175).  
In essence, confirmation bias means letting what one believes, looks forward to, 
or wants to prove drive the process of information selection, integration, and evaluation 
in a way that confirms, instead of tests, the pre-existing beliefs, expectations or 
hypotheses. In the case of argument reading, for instance, confirmation bias may lead to 
limited attention to reasons and evidence included in belief-inconsistent arguments, and 
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biased evaluation of the validity of the arguments. In the case of argument construction, 
confirmation bias may lead to neglect of alternative beliefs, and weighing supporting 
reasons or evidence more favorably than opposing reasons or evidence in order to 
preserve existing beliefs.  
The presence of confirmation bias has been documented extensively in studies on 
human reasoning, basically under two paradigms differing at types of reasoning task used. 
The first paradigm uses a formal reasoning task which entails reasoning in abstract 
context using logic rules such as the Wason’s Card Selection Task (e.g., Handley, Feeney, 
& Harper, 2002; Hardman, 1998), and 2-4-6 Task (e.g., Cherubini, Castelvecchio, & 
Cherubini, 2005; Gale & Ball, 2009) or statistical rules (e.g., probabilistic assessment 
tasks). In aggregate, findings on these tasks’ performance have shown individuals tend to 
seek evidence or feedback that will confirm the hypothesis to be tested and thus 
paradoxically fail to test the hypothesis.  
The second paradigm uses reasoning tasks embedded in social scenarios or social 
environment contexts which involve the formation and examination of “social theories” 
or “social judgment.” These tasks ask participants to form beliefs about relationship 
between variables specific to hypothetical or real people in social context (Anderson & 
Sechler, 1986). Research findings have indicated people often tend to form premature 
beliefs quickly (e.g., Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968), persist on initial 
beliefs which have been proved false (e.g., Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), weigh 
evidence in a way preferable to existing beliefs (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), 
and fail to look for negative cases or consider the possibility of alternative judgments 
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(e.g., Chambliss & Garner, 1996; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Hodgins & 
Zuckerman, 1993).  
General Psychological Explanations of Confirmation Bias 
Psychologists have proposed several accounts of confirmation bias. One approach 
to explaining confirmation bias is to pin down cognitive errors which cause confirmation 
bias. Arkes (1991), for instance, conceptualized three types of errors: strategy-based, 
association-based, and psychophysically based errors. Strategy-based errors prevail when 
individuals think the cost (time, effort) of being accurate outweighs the benefit of being 
accurate, or the benefit of being efficient (but inaccurate) outweighs the cost of being 
inaccurate and a less than optimal judgment or decision is made in order to be efficient. 
Association-based errors come from an association-based memory mechanism that 
underlies priming effects on information encoding and retrieval. Arkes has shown 
confirmation bias is caused primarily by association-based errors. He argued  
confirmation bias is a demonstration of the priming effects arising from pre-existing or 
pre-assumed (but untrue) association between two variables (e.g., the illusory correlation 
between personality traits and characteristics of drawings). Finally, psychophysically 
based errors have their origin in the innate non-linear relationship between physical 
intensity and psychological response and may be generalized to decision making 
situations to produce irrational behaviors. 
An alternative approach to explaining confirmation bias is in terms of cognitive 
versus motivational accounts. Kunda (1990) extensively examined the empirical studies 
on confirmation bias with an effort to tease apart cognitive and motivational factors 
which contribute to confirmation bias. In Kunda’s discussion of the distinction between 
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confirmation biases driven by deliberately self-serving reasoning versus those resulting 
from unrecognized limitations imposed by knowledge and beliefs, she noted  
motivational factors can play a role in confirmation bias even when individuals are 
unaware that their reasoning is biased by their beliefs.  
From Kunda’s (1990) analyses, it seems confirmation bias is related to both the 
individual tendency in information processing and environmental input. As far as 
individual tendency is concerned, Kunda has identified a dichotomy of goals as a 
motivational construct which can have great impact on reasoning process, namely an 
accuracy goal versus a directional goal. People endorsing the accuracy goal, she argues, 
will spontaneously reason on a more objective foundation by engaging in deep processing 
and using appropriate strategies as far as they can access such strategies. In contrast, 
people with the directional goal will tend to access prior knowledge and task information 
in a way preferential to the belief they want to argue for. People endorsing the directional 
goal also use biased inferential rules. She further noted  directional goal-driven reasoners 
may perceive themselves as rational and objective, without an awareness of their biased 
memory search and rule accessing.  
As far as environmental constraints are concerned, Kunda (1990) has argued  a 
motivational account alone cannot sufficiently explain the phenomenon of confirmation 
bias, because even biased reasoners’ reasoning seems to be constrained by the plausibility 
of the conclusion in relation to evidence or prior knowledge, as indicated by findings 
showing the variation of reasoning outcome as a function of task information. This is to 
say, individuals do not entertain an absolute freedom to argue at will for any conclusion 
they personally prefer. Thus, as far as using a strategy intervention as a remedy to 
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confirmation bias is concerned, an analysis of cognitive accounts of confirmation bias are 
likely to provide insights into mechanisms of confirmation bias and its potential 
correction.  
Cognitive Accounts of Confirmation Bias 
Edwards and Smith (1996) proposed a disconfirmation model to describe the 
asymmetry between cognitive processing of belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent 
arguments. They presented evidence from two experiments in support of a 
disconfirmation model interpretation. According to the disconfirmation model, people 
tend to exert more mental effort to examine belief-inconsistent arguments than belief-
consistent arguments. Also, their approaches to dealing with these two kinds of 
arguments differ in that they evaluate belief-inconsistent arguments by accessing 
counterevidence from memory search, but do not do so for belief-consistent arguments. 
This model seems to be intuitively plausible and the four hypotheses it has generated 
have also been consistent with experimental results. However, two features of Edwards 
and Smith’s experimental methods appear to leave these results open to other 
interpretations. One is their use of processing time as an indicator of deep processing, 
with longer time seen as reflecting deeper (yet biased) processing. The other feature is, 
their participants were asked to generate thoughts and arguments in response to each kind 
of arguments, with a larger number of thoughts and arguments seen as indicators of 
deeper processing.  
It can be argued  biased processing is not necessarily associated with long 
processing time. Instead, length of processing time might be a function of ease or 
difficulty of retrieving memory content. If counterevidence and counterarguments to 
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belief-inconsistent arguments can be easily accessed during memory search, one could 
reach a closure on evaluation within relatively short time. Thus, prior knowledge level 
and automaticity of memory association possibly mediate the relationship between 
processing time and to what extent the judgmental approach is biased.  
Likewise, being able to generate more counterarguments does not necessarily 
reflect deeper and more thorough processing of the belief-inconsistent information per se. 
Admittedly, individuals on average would need to exert greater mental effort to generate 
more counterarguments to the belief-incompatible information than to generate fewer 
counterarguments to such information. However, individuals could easily focus on some 
perceptually prominent (but unimportant) detail (e.g. word usage) of such information 
and generate several refuting arguments to the detail, without genuinely examining the 
logical structure and evidence quality within such information. In addition to exerting 
great mental effort to refute belief-inconsistent information, ignoring or minimally 
processing such information can also serve the purpose of preserving existing beliefs.  
Yet another cognitive account of confirmation bias has been examined in the work 
of Kuhn and her colleagues (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992; Kuhn, 
2005) (although she seldom used the term “confirmation bias”). Kuhn, Schauble, and 
Garcia-Mila (1992) found some participants engaging in a scientific reasoning task 
manipulated independent variables to demonstrate their theory about the effects of these 
variables was true rather than to test their theory. For example, they manipulated multiple 
variables to create the condition which would most likely lead to the effects, whereas the 
correct method to test a theory is to vary the level of one variable at a time while keeping 
levels of other variables constant. These participants may not have realized  the first 
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approach is subject to confirmation bias and thus not a productive way to test a theory. 
They also might not realize there could be a different approach. To construct unbiased 
arguments, therefore, one should be able to distinguish evidence from claims in the first 
place, rather than integrating both into a demonstration of “what the thing is”. For 
individuals who do not possess such cognition, external support needs to be provided to 
help them represent claims and evidence independently as the first step to combat 
confirmation bias in argumentation. 
In sum, based on the discussion and reviews above, it can be seen, a cognitive 
approach to explaining confirmation bias entails a number of mechanisms potentially 
underlying such bias. First, individuals may be unaware of the confirmation bias induced 
by associative-type errors as a result of existing beliefs. Thus, the design of cognitive 
strategies as a remedy to confirmation bias should address such unconscious process of 
information. Second, individuals may lack an understanding of the distinction between 
claims and evidence/reasons such that they tend to construct argumentation in a flawed 
manner. Thus, a cognitive remedy to confirmation bias in argumentation should facilitate 
such understanding. 
Belief Change and Readers’ Transaction with Reading Materials 
Educational researchers recently have begun to examine belief change on 
controversial topics for which evidence is available for both sides of the issue. Such 
research has usually used the term “topic belief”. With a few exceptions (e.g. see 
D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014, for an emotion-based account of belief 
change), most studies on topic belief change have generally examined belief change after 
reading arguments, conclusions and/or evidence on both sides of a controversial issue 
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(e.g., climate change, whether transgenetic food is harmful). Two characteristics of 
research in this area are relevant to the purpose and design of this proposed research. The 
first is, most studies have focused on text characteristics and their effects on belief 
change, for instance, targeting how types of text or presentation of text can increase the 
likelihood of belief change. The second is findings suggesting explicitly prompting 
students to fairly consider both sides of an issue is ineffective for producing belief change.  
As far as text type is concerned, Andiliou, Ramsay, Murphy and Fast (2012), for 
instance, examined the persuasive effects of intratextual messages on readers’ belief 
change. Intratextual message was defined in their study as a side-by-side combination of 
two one-sided texts into a single message. The results showed 70% of the readers 
maintained their initial position on the topic. These participants also demonstrated belief 
polarization after reading the intratextual message, which contains arguments from both 
sides of the issue. They suggested the persuasive effect of an intratextual message is 
minimal and comparable to the effect of a two-sided non-refutational text. Since the 
intratextual message is inherently complex, it is probable readers either did not 
sufficiently understand the complicated information presented or processed information 
from each side in a biased manner to preserve initial beliefs. Along the same line, 
Diakidoy, Kendeou, and Ioannides (2003) compared the effects of different text structure 
on belief change in science. They found students reading refutational text achieved more 
conceptual change gains than students who read expository text, with the effect of the 
latter comparable to regular instruction. However, the length of the refutational text (1039 
words) in their study was about twice the length of the expository text (522 words), 
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which seems likely to have introduced the amount of information as a confounding 
variable which could have affected learning gains.  
With regard to text presentation, Kobayashi (2010) examined whether the order of 
pro-argument and anti-argument presentation affects readers’ evaluation of these 
arguments. The results showed presentation order only affected argument evaluation 
when readers identified the refutational relationship between the pro-arguments and anti-
arguments. This suggests readers’ awareness of how arguments and counterarguments are 
related may mediate the effects of text characteristics on belief outcome. Along this same 
line, Murphy, Long, Holleran, and Esterly (2003) examined whether presentation form of 
a persuasive message affected belief change. They found whether the message was 
presented on computer or in paper-based form did not affect belief outcome. In aggregate, 
research on relationships between text characteristics and belief change seem to have 
shown limited and sometimes confounded effects of the former. It may be that readers’ 
transactions with text, rather than text characteristics alone, are more critical to belief 
change outcome resultant from text reading.  
So, what do research findings on verbal instructions designed to increase the 
likelihood of desirable reader-text transactions suggest about belief change? The study 
conducted by McCrudden and Sparks (2014) is one of a few educational psychology 
studies published on this topic. They examined the effects of verbal instruction on belief 
change by comparing four conditions: 1) a rationale instruction plus evidence instruction 
condition; 2) a rationale instruction only condition; 3) an evidence instruction only 
condition; and 4) a control condition.  
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The rationale instruction explicitly emphasized the importance and benefit of 
considering multiple perspectives on a controversial issue. The evidence instruction 
explained the nature of evidence and reasons as “types of information that is used to 
support and justify a position,” and prompted individuals to pay close attention to the 
evidence and reasons on both sides of the issue. It also provided a specific argument 
example for which the claim and the evidence/reason were respectively identified. 
Although topic beliefs were lowered after reading in general, pair-wise comparison 
showed the only significant result was produced by the evidence instruction condition. 
Such a finding suggests verbal instruction prompting readers to be fair may not be an 
effective strategy for changing beliefs. In contrast, content that fosters understanding of 
the role of evidence/reason and facilitates separate representation of claims versus 
evidence/reason may be a more useful persuasive strategy.  
Similarly, there have been research findings in domains of general and social 
psychology showing that some debiasing strategies are more effective than others. Lord, 
Lepper, and Preston (1984), for instance, compared two types of bias-correcting 
strategies’ effects on belief change. They found the strategy of making the opposite more 
salient had a stronger debiasing effect on social judgment than simply describing the 
targeted bias to participants and asking them to be fair. In the context of formal reasoning 
tasks, Evans et al. (1994) found verbal instruction on logical rules is not very effective on 
improving task performance.  
Taken together, prior findings seem to suggest explicitly asking belief holders to 
be objective may not be an effective remedy to confirmation bias. If confirmation bias 
results from automatic, association-typed processing and/or a lack of understanding of the 
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distinction between claims and evidence/reasons, it seems doubtful simply asking belief 
holders to be fair will address the underlying mechanisms of confirmation bias. 
Like argumentation and belief change on a controversial topic, conceptual change 
learning also involves awareness, understanding, and evaluation of belief-inconsistent 
information, such as anomalous data (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Thus, cognitive strategies 
used to facilitate conceptual change learning are likely useful for facilitating unbiased 
argumentation and reflective belief change. Chinn and Brewer (1993) discussed several 
factors affecting conceptual change learning outcome and suggested eleven instructional 
strategies respectively addressing prior knowledge, the alternative theory, anomalous data, 
and processing strategies. Of these, facilitating deep processing and increasing perceived 
plausibility of alternative theory seem to be the two strategies most pertinent to the 
purpose of this proposed research. Deep processing and perceived plausibility of 
alternatives both can be addressed by using an appropriate cognitive strategy. One strong 
candidate is elaborative interrogation, a cognitive strategy which has been shown to 
facilitate deep processing (Pressley, Wood, Woloshyn, Martin, King, & Menke, 1992) 
and which would seem to have the potential also to increase perceived plausibility of 
alternatives. In the next section, literature on elaborative interrogation is reviewed in 
detail to discuss its cognitive mechanism and to analyze its potential as a remedy to 
confirmation bias affecting quality of argumentation and reflective belief change.   
Elaborative Interrogation: Potential Effects on Correcting Biased Processing 
Elaborative interrogation is a cognitive strategy originally used to improve 
learning of factual information by prompting learners to answer “why” questions on the 
relationship between two things involved in a factual proposition. For example, if the to-
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be-learned fact is “The oldest building of any Canadian university is located on the 
school's main campus,” the corresponding elaborative interrogation question would be 
“Why do you think the oldest building of any Canadian university is located on the 
school's main campus?” (Woloshyn, Willoughby, Wood, & Pressley, 1990). To answer 
the question, learners are encouraged to use their prior knowledge to explicitly build the 
case whereby the relationship between the state and its characteristic seems plausible. In 
essence, elaborative interrogation prompts learners to generate information explaining 
why the to-be-learned fact may be true.  
As discussed by Pressley, Woloshyn, Lysynchuk, Martin, Wood, and Willoughby 
(1990), a learning strategy should entail cognitive processing beyond mental operations 
learners automatically engage with when processing the material. In this sense, a 
cognitive strategy intended to improve argumentation and lead to reflective belief change 
on a controversial topic must achieve several cognitive goals. First, since confirmation 
bias is caused by association-typed errors, the debiasing strategy must combat the 
automatic information association (which individuals may not be aware of) preferential to 
existing beliefs. Second, the strategy should enable learners to use a more sophisticated 
model of argumentation based on separate representation of claims and evidence or 
reasons. Third, it should facilitate understanding of belief-inconsistent arguments such 
that learners can develop effective rebuttals and/or change beliefs accordingly. Following 
I make the case that elaborative interrogation has the potential to correct confirmation 
bias in the process of reading belief-inconsistent arguments. I also propose a specific type 
of elaborative interrogation here to achieve these cognitive goals.  
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Elaborative interrogation is different from other elaboration strategies (e.g., the 
strategy of elaborated questions used in Golanics and Nussbaum, 2008) in that it does not 
provide any additional information beyond what is already contained in the fact itself. 
Thus, effects of elaborative interrogation on learning can only be attributed to the 
cognitive processes which elaborative interrogation itself entails, without introduction of 
confounding effects from the addition of information by the strategy. Studies on 
elaborative interrogation began at the end of 1980s and developed into a coherent line of 
research in 1990s. Its positive effect on factual learning has been established based on 
experimental findings on learners of different age and knowledge level, and on to-be-
learned materials of different format. Also, although many researchers had directed 
attention away from elaborative interrogation studies by the end of the 1990s, in recent 
years several researchers (e.g., Dornisch & Sperling, 2006, 2008; Dornisch, Sperling, & 
Zeruth, 2011; Ozgungor & Guthrie, 2004) have extended the scope of elaborative 
interrogation by examining its effects on higher-order learning. This section reviews 
studies of effects of elaborative interrogation on factual and higher-order learning, such 
as inference making and problem solving. The section also discusses these effects in 
relation to the causes of confirmation bias. 
Effects of Elaborative Interrogation on Factual Learning 
Early research on elaborative interrogation has documented its effects on 
improving factual learning, with large effect sizes noted when the learning outcomes 
were measured by association and/or recognition test items (e.g., Pressley et al., 1992). 
For example, Wood, Pressley, and Winne (1990) compared learning effects of elaborative 
interrogation, experimenter-provided elaboration, imagination, and free study (the control 
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condition) on learning of two types of factual materials. Their Experiment 1 used 
arbitrary facts in the form of single sentences, with one sentence describing a man with a 
certain feature engaging in an activity which was random to the feature (e.g., The tall 
man bought the crackers.). Experiment 2 used more ecologically valid material consisting 
of animal-related facts in the form of a prose message in which six sentences were 
combined into a paragraph. Each sentence stated a real characteristic of the animal (e.g., 
The skunk mostly eats corn.) and learning outcomes were measured by cued-recall items 
which were of an associative nature (e.g. Which animal mostly eats corn?). In both 
experiments, Wood et al. found the elaborative interrogation conditions produced 
significantly better learning outcomes as compared to all other conditions.  
Seifert (1993) compared effects of elaborative interrogation on learning a prose 
passage on animal characteristics to an underline-only condition and an underline with 
provided elaboration condition. He found participants in the elaborative interrogation 
condition outperformed other participants on associative memory tests. Likewise, Seifert 
(1994) compared an elaborative interrogation condition and a condition of answering 
verbatim-response questions which asked participants to locate and copy the to-be-
learned information from the prose message. He found elaborative interrogation 
participants outperformed verbatim-response participants on matching test items. 
Moreover, Woloshyn, Willoughby, Wood, and Pressley (1990) found even when 
elaborative interrogation participants failed to recall complete facts, they still 
outperformed control participants on tests of the associations between the two things 
involved in the facts (e.g., a university and a factual attribute of the university, as used in 
their study). These findings suggest, by inducing association-typed processing, 
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elaborative interrogation can be an effective cognitive strategy to improve learning of 
facts.  
Effects of elaborative interrogation on factual learning also seem to be long-
lasting. Willoughby, Waller, Wood, and MacKinnon (1993), for instance, found the 
positive effect of elaborative interrogation on factual learning was still present when 
tested one month after study of the facts. Similarly, Kahl and Woloshyn (1994) found the 
advantage of elaborative interrogation group relative to reading controls was maintained 
in both 30- and 60-day follow-ups. Moreover, Woloshyn, Paivio and Pressley (1994) 
found elaborative interrogation effects to be present for up to 6 months after experimental 
sessions.  
Interestingly, Woloshyn et al. (1990) found even when participants in the 
elaborative interrogation condition failed to generate adequate answers to the “why” 
questions, their factual learning was still improved, with these findings later replicated by 
Woloshyn et al. (1994). These researchers explained these findings by referring to the 
automatic activation of a semantic memory network related to the to-be-learned facts, 
which arguably would strengthen memory of the association between two things 
contained in the facts. They also emphasized  such a finding has educational significance 
because not all students are able to generate adequate answers to elaborative interrogation 
questions when they are exposed to the material for the first time. It also seems the 
learning effects of elaborative interrogation are comparable to certain other effective 
learning strategies. For instance, the learning gains from elaborative interrogation were 
found to be of comparable size to those produced by visual imagery on learning factual 
information (e.g., Pressley et al., 1988, as summarized by Menke and Pressley, 1994).  
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Effects of Elaborative Interrogation on Higher-Order Learning 
Effects of elaborative interrogation on factual learning have been replicated under 
conditions that include variations in group sizes (e.g. Kahl & Woloshyn, 1994), 
individual versus collaborative learning contexts (e.g., Wood, Fler, & Willoughby, 1992), 
and use in special populations (e.g., Greene, Symons, & Richards, 1996). Researchers 
interested in examining the role of elaborative interrogation in higher-order learning 
(inference making, integration, coherence construction and problem-solving transfer), 
however, have found data patterns more complicated and mixed than findings on the 
learning of factual information. 
Some studies have shown elaborative interrogation is effective for some types of 
higher-order learning, but not for others. For instance, McDaniel and Donnelly (1996) 
designed two text type conditions for each of twelve scientific concepts. One text type 
was a literal description of the concept and the other was an analogy that related the 
concept to a domain familiar to their participants. All participants were randomly 
assigned to the two text type conditions, and to three strategy conditions including 
elaborative interrogation condition, pictorial schematics condition, and key-word 
highlighting condition in a 2 × 3 factorial design. They used multiple-choice items as the 
outcome measure. Some of these items measured learning at the level of factual 
recognition, and the remaining measured learning at the inference level (e.g., What would 
happen if a star expanded instead of collapsing?). McDaniel and Donnelly found 
elaborative interrogation produced learning gains in both factual and inference learning, 
and such effects were present regardless of text type conditions.  
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Further, Ozgungor and Guthrie (2004) examined effects of elaborative 
interrogation on different types of higher-order learning from reading scientific article. 
They used short-answer questions and matching tasks to measure recall, along with an 
inferences verification task (judging whether experimenter-provided inferences are true 
or false) which measures text-based inference making. The internal consistency of 
participant-generated semantic networks was assessed for measuring coherence 
construction as a type of higher-order learning other than inference learning. They found 
conditions (elaborative interrogation versus reading control) explained differences in 
outcome from recall and inference making measure, but not performance on the 
coherence construction measure.  
Along the same line, Dornisch and Sperling (2006) compared participants in 
elaborative interrogation and reading control conditions on factual recognition, free recall, 
and problem-solving transfer. The text they used was on the topic of principles in retail, 
merchandising, and accounting, and presented on a computer screen with elaborative 
interrogation questioned listed along the side of the text. Dornisch and Sperling found 
elaborative interrogation was most effective for factual recognition, but had only limited 
effects on free recall, where significant differences were found for immediate recall, but 
not delayed recall. No significant effects were observed on problem-solving transfer. In 
addition, Dornisch et al. (2011) used text on the topics of standardized testing and normal 
distribution and had participants complete matching items, multiple-choice items, open-
ended items, factual recall items, integration questions, and a problem-solving transfer 
item. To answer the integration questions, participants needed to utilize information 
across sentences or paragraphs. Elaborative interrogation was found to have no 
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significant effect on integration and problem-solving transfer as compared to other 
conditions. Thus, in aggregate, these findings suggest as far as higher-order learning is 
concerned, elaborative interrogation may be an effective strategy for improving inference 
learning, but may not be useful for improving coherence construction, integration, and 
problem-solving transfer.  
Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Elaborative Interrogation 
In addition to the differentiated effects of elaborative interrogation on different 
types of higher-order learning reviewed above, text and learner characteristics also seem 
to matter with regard to the extent to which elaborative interrogation is effective. 
Specifically, the amount of elaboration contained in the text, topic domain of the text, and 
level of learners’ prior knowledge are variables shown to affect the effectiveness of 
elaborative interrogation. 
As far as text characteristics are concerned, effects of elaborative interrogation 
seem to be affected by the amount of elaboration contained within the text. For example, 
Greene et al. (1996) found elaborative interrogation had a considerable effect on recalling 
single facts but the effects were mixed on recognition and comprehension of paragraph-
length materials, depending on whether the paragraphs consisted of sentences which 
already included some elaborative detail. Specifically, elaborative interrogation only 
improved recall for paragraphs consisting of sentences not elaborated on.  
Topic domain also seems to matter regarding whether elaborative interrogation is 
effective or not. When Dornisch and Sperling (2008) used text on a statistical topic, 
elaborative interrogation had no effect on either lower or higher-order learning outcome. 
In the view of these researchers, this lack of effect was probably due to learners’ lack of 
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prior knowledge needed for generating elaboration at a minimal necessary level. This 
finding is also consistent with O'Reilly, Symons, and MacLatchy-Gaudet’s (1998) results 
using study material of biological facts. They compared elaborative interrogation 
conditions with a self-explanation condition and a repetition control condition. 
Elaborative interrogation participants answered aloud the question “why does it make 
sense that… (the content of a sentence)?” Self-explanation participants were asked to 
“…explain what the sentence means to you. That is, what new information does the 
sentence provide for you? And how does it relate to what you already know?” O'Reilly et 
al. found no difference between elaborative interrogation and a control condition on cued 
recall and recognition tests, whereas participants in self-explanation condition performed 
significantly better than both elaborative interrogation and control conditions. They 
attributed the absence of elaborative interrogation effects to participants’ lack of prior 
knowledge on the topic of the material.  
Along the same line, Woloshyn, Pressley, and Schneider (1992) found although 
elaborative interrogation improved factual learning for all participants, high-knowledge 
participants in reading-control condition still outperformed low-knowledge participants in 
elaborative interrogation condition. Similarly, Woloshyn, Wood, and Willoughby (1994) 
found use of elaborative interrogation especially benefited participants who had at least 
some relevant prior knowledge. These findings suggest elaborative interrogation may be 
useful only when learners are not novices to the topic domain. These findings are 
consistent with Pressley et al.’s (1992) review that elaborative interrogation generally has 
a larger effect for adult learners than for children, who presumably have lower knowledge 
level in the topic domain than do adults. 
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 Research findings reviewed above have important implications in showing the 
effectiveness of elaborative interrogation as dependent on the level or nature of learning, 
text characteristics, and learners’ prior knowledge in the domain of the to-be-learned 
information. I now turn to an analysis of cognitive mechanisms which likely explain the 
entire pattern of elaborative interrogation effects on different levels/types of learning, 
different materials and learners with different levels of prior knowledge.  
The Cognitive Mechanisms of Elaborative Interrogation 
This final section provides a review of research findings on elaborative 
interrogation effects, focusing on comparisons of such effects as a function of learning 
level/type, text characteristics, and learners’ prior knowledge level. Findings from such 
research have provided empirical basis for an analysis of cognitive mechanisms 
underlying effects of elaborative interrogation. To examine the potential of elaborative 
interrogation of being an effective remedy to confirmation bias, cognitive mechanisms of 
elaborative interrogation should be compared and connected to the cause of confirmation 
bias affecting argumentation and belief change. Thus, for the purposes of this research, 
the next section is aimed at answering the following questions. What cognitive 
mechanisms make elaborative interrogation effective (or ineffective)? Does the presence 
of such mechanisms indicate elaborative interrogation is likely to be useful for combating 
confirmation bias? Does elaborative interrogation need to be adapted in order to 
maximize its potential to improve argumentation and bring about reflective belief change 
through combating confirmation bias? 
Elaborative interrogation as an association-strengthening mechanism. In 
general, elaborative interrogation researchers agree responding to a “why” question is 
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likely to strengthen the association between two items and thus primes memory for such 
associations (Seifert, 1993). Such an association strengthening account of elaborative 
interrogation effects seems to be plausible, since research evidence suggests elaborative 
interrogation effects on factual learning is unaffected by the quality of answer generated 
by individuals in response to the “why” questions (Menke & Pressley, 1994). For 
example, Menke and Pressley (1994) speculated  simply attempting to answer a why 
question improves memory for facts, and Woloshyn et al. (1994) found the quality of 
answer in fact had no significant effect on memory. This means, it may not matter 
whether an answer to the “why” question is based on an analysis of causal relationships 
between the two items or simply an arbitrary connection of items as created by learners. 
In other words, elaborative interrogation effects based on an association-strengthening 
mechanism will be present as long as learners have connected items by any means. Such 
memory content does not have to be well-justified knowledge on the two items. This 
means learning of an association could occur regardless of the nature of the association 
(e.g., causal-logical versus arbitrary) that learners are cognizant of. 
The knowledge activation mechanism. In a 1994 study, Kahl and Woloshyn 
presented empirical data which seemed to provide evidence against the view of 
association-strengthening mechanism as the sole explanation of elaborative interrogation 
effects. They observed  individuals’ memory for facts were better when they generated 
scientifically correct answers to elaborative interrogation questions by using relevant 
prior knowledge to clarify target information. In their view, a prior knowledge activation 
account better explained their findings that students learned more when they were 
explicitly prompted to activate relevant prior knowledge.  
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Since quality of answer to elaborative interrogation questions is likely an indicator 
of learners’ prior knowledge, elaborative interrogation studies have grouped answers of 
differing qualities into categories to examine the role of prior knowledge in learning 
effects of elaborative interrogation, most typically into three broad categories: adequate 
answer, inadequate answer, and no-response. In general, an adequate answer explains 
why the to-be-learned fact may be true. In contrast, an inadequate answer offers no 
explanation and may constitute a mere repetition of the fact. Importantly, in order to 
examine the mediating role of quality of answer, Willoughby, Waller, Wood, and 
MacKinnon (1993) further categorized adequate answers into three subcategories: 
adequate-correct (explanations which demonstrate expert knowledge), adequate-pat 
(explanations which are correct but too general), and adequate-incorrect (explanations 
which are incorrect in spite of an attempt to explain). They found, within the three 
subcategories of adequate elaborations, the adequate-correct elaborations were associated 
with greater probability of correct recall than were correct but too general and incorrect 
elaborations.  
In aggregate, these findings suggest prior knowledge, as indicated by quality of 
answer to the “why” questions, may have a mediating role in the mechanism which 
makes elaborative interrogation effective for factual learning. However, it seems the 
mediating role of prior knowledge should be examined on the basis of a more careful 
distinction among elaboration answers of varied quality and type. Willoughby et al.’s 
(1993) finding suggests adequate answers to elaborative interrogation questions (i.e., 
answers which constitute explanations, rather than mere repetition of facts) may not be a 
homogeneous grouping. It is possible, even likely, whether adequate answers are correct 
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and specific, correct but too general, or incorrect reflects how much topic knowledge 
learners possess and/or how much of such knowledge is activated, which in turn mediates 
the relationship between elaborative interrogation and learning outcomes. 
The confirmatory mechanism. In elaborative interrogation studies using 
random-assignment experimental design, participants in elaborative interrogation 
condition, on average, have prior knowledge level equal to those in other condition(s) 
because of random assignment. This to say, for groups of individuals with equal average 
prior knowledge, those in the elaborative interrogation condition still demonstrated 
learning gains. Thus, there may be other mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of 
elaborative interrogation which lead to learning gains in addition to the learning gains 
attributed to prior knowledge. A confirmatory mechanism may provide explanation to 
learning gains not explained by the prior knowledge account. 
Martin and Pressley (1991) compared elaborative interrogation effects across 
experimental groups using elaborative interrogation questions of different natures. Some 
elaborative interrogation participants were asked to explain why the to-be-learned facts 
make sense, as is conventionally done in elaborative interrogation studies. In contrast, 
other elaborative interrogation participants were asked to explain why the to-be-learned 
facts do not make sense. The latter approach was also elaborative interrogation by 
definition but may have activated a different subset of prior knowledge from that 
activated by the conventional elaborative interrogation questions. Consistent with their 
hypothesis, Martin and Pressley (1991) found elaborative interrogation effects were the 
largest when participants answered questions in a way that confirms the facts, although 
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answering refuting elaborative interrogation questions also improved learning as 
compared to reading-control performance.  
Based on this finding, it may be inferred  there are possibly two cognitive 
processes underlying elaborative interrogation effect. First, elaborative interrogation 
strengthens the association between two items by prompting learners to think about their 
relationship, which is aligned with the previously discussed association strengthening 
mechanism. Second, elaborative interrogation directs memory search toward the memory 
content in support of the relationship as stated in to-be-learned facts, which facilitates 
assimilation of the new information into individuals’ existing structure of memory 
content. The latter process could be accounted for by a confirmatory mechanism. This 
means some learning gains provided by elaborative interrogation can be attributed to the 
process of activating memory content which confirms what is stated in the to-be-learned 
information (Pressley, Wood, Woloshyn, Martin, King, & Menke, 1992).  
Furthermore, elaborative interrogation effects attributed to the association 
strengthening process and the confirmatory process are possibly additive. Since refuting 
or disconfirming elaborative interrogations can also prompt individuals to think about the 
relationship between the two items in a fact statement, it is possible the association 
between the two items is strengthened by refuting or disconfirming elaborative 
interrogations as well. However, the disconfirming elaborative interrogation does not 
provide any learning gains by confirming the to-be-learned fact, which possibly explains 
why Martin and Pressley (1991) found the refuting or disconfirming elaborative 
interrogation group outperformed the reading control, and the conventional or confirming 
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elaborative interrogation group outperformed the refuting or disconfirming elaborative 
interrogation group. 
Along this same line, Woloshyn et al. (1994) also investigated whether 
elaborative interrogation could improve learning of factual information inconsistent with 
students' existing beliefs, based on the hypothesis students often possessed memory 
content which could be used to support information inconsistent with existing beliefs. 
They found although participants across all conditions tended to remember more belief-
consistent facts than belief-inconsistent facts, elaborative interrogation did have positive 
effects on the retention of belief-inconsistent facts. This is a finding particularly 
important to the current study, which includes conditions involving reading belief-
inconsistent arguments on a controversial topic. In general, it could be argued  for 
controversial topics individuals presumably possess relevant memory content that makes 
elaboration possible. Further, individuals may possess both memory content consistent 
and that inconsistent with their positions on the topic, which could make the use of 
elaborative interrogation productive on facilitating learning of belief-inconsistent 
arguments.  
Connections between Elaborative Interrogation and Confirmation Bias 
As previously reviewed, Arkes (1991) distinguished among three types of errors 
as causes of judgment and decision biases, and attributed confirmation bias to the type of 
association-based errors. He further argued , in order to combat confirmation bias, 
individuals should be instructed on the use of a strategy which will create new association 
or change the original ones. Given that it improves association-typed learning, 
elaborative interrogation seems intuitively to be an appropriate strategy to address 
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confirmation bias. That is, elaborative interrogation may actually create or strengthen 
associations favoring learning belief-inconsistent information. Such effects could then 
neutralize the bias-inducing effects of original associations which typically undermine the 
learning of belief-inconsistent information.   
Specifically, as can be inferred from the feature of the knowledge activation and 
confirmatory mechanisms discussed above, elaborative interrogation can potentially 
facilitate encoding of belief-inconsistent content by two processes. First, using an 
elaborative interrogation strategy may activate individuals’ memory content which is in 
favor of the belief-inconsistent information, which may facilitate the connection between 
the belief-inconsistent information and individuals’ existing knowledge structures. 
Second, explaining or attempting to explain why belief-inconsistent information makes 
sense may confirm the association constituted within the belief-inconsistent information, 
which may facilitate comprehension of the coherence of such information. Thus, 
elaborative interrogation strategy would seem to hold the potential for strengthening 
associations tied to belief-inconsistent information for a more balanced encoding of 
information from both sides of a controversial topic. The resultant balanced encoding 
may remedy confirmation bias induced by preexisting beliefs on the controversial topic. 
Therefore, it can be argued  elaborative interrogation would be a useful debiasing strategy 
if utilized to facilitate deep and unbiased processing of belief-inconsistent arguments. 
In their disconfirmation model, Edwards and Smith (1996) attribute confirmation 
bias both to biased evaluation of belief-inconsistent information and biased memory 
search in favor of preservation of existing beliefs. According to this model, as far as 
argument learning is concerned, biased memory search results in more refutational 
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thoughts generated in response to belief-inconsistent content. Also, as Kardash and 
Howell (2000) have discussed, people with confirmation bias tend to distort belief-
inconsistent information to preserve existing beliefs and attitudes, while tending to accept 
belief-consistent information at its face value. Thus, using elaborative interrogation to 
combat such asymmetry of information encoding and retrieval on controversial topics 
entails helping belief-holders take the perspective of an arguer refuting their preexisting 
beliefs in order to sufficiently process belief-inconsistent arguments in a more objective 
manner. In other words, elaborative interrogation questions in this case should tend to 
engage individuals in thinking about why arguments opposing to their beliefs make sense.  
Such a suggestion is also congruent with Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, and 
Schreiber’s (2004) findings from their study of the effects of reasoning context on causal 
reasoning performance. Their tasks contained information of causal effects inconsistent 
with participants’ prior beliefs. They compared participants’ reasoning performance in 
abstract and personal settings, finding a higher percentage of participants drew accurate 
conclusions about belief-inconsistent causal effects in an abstract setting than in one that 
entailed personal perspective. Thus, it seems asking individuals to answer “why it makes 
sense…” elaborative interrogation questions on the side of arguments which refute prior 
beliefs may eliminate belief-induced bias by having individuals take a reasoning stance 
not in favor of their own beliefs.  
Similarly, Greenhoot et al. (2004) also found in abstract reasoning settings 
understanding of information on evidence and experiment control related to the causal 
scenario positively affected accuracy of reasoning conclusion. In contrast, in personal 
reasoning settings they found it was accuracy of prior beliefs that was associated with 
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accuracy outcome. Explaining their results within the framework of dual-process theory, 
they argued  cognitive processes generated by elaborative interrogation could allow 
learners to tap into both of the two processing routes of dual-process theory to remedy 
confirmation bias. 
Further Connections based on a Dual-Process Account 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) proposed a dual-process model, which distinguished 
between two routes of processing—central route processing and peripheral route 
processing. With regard to the processing of arguments, as Murphy (2007) discussed, 
individuals who evaluate the arguments based on logic and reasons engage in central 
processing, in which they are usually conscious about their central-processing-based 
thinking and reasoning. In contrast, individuals whose reasoning is emotionally charged 
and who rely on heuristics such as the character of the arguer, perceptual prominence of 
an argument’s wording of the argument, or environmental cues to draw conclusions and 
tend to engage in peripheral processing. They also are unaware of their peripheral-
processing-based reasoning.  
Confirmation bias could result from processing at central level, peripheral level, 
or both. Specifically, the research on explanation availability (e.g., Arkes, 1991; Slusher 
& Anderson, 1996) and the research on simulation heuristics (e.g., Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004) specifically may provide a central 
processing and a peripheral account of confirmation bias. As the two levels of processing 
often occur simultaneously, elaborative interrogation strategy could address cognitive 
mechanism of confirmation bias at both levels. Thus, it may be useful to examine the 
roles of explanation availability as a type of central processing and simulation heuristics 
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as a type of peripheral processing to shed light on mechanism connections between 
elaborative interrogation and confirmation bias.  
Explanation availability as central processing. Explanation availability refers to 
whether an explanation of a belief is readily available for memory search. Theoretical 
discussion and empirical evidence seem to converge on the effects of explanation 
availability as a critical factor contributing to both confirmation bias and belief change. 
Nickerson (1998) has argued  confirmation bias results from the causal reciprocity 
between the stance a person takes and the availability of reasons supporting that stance. 
In other words, people take a stance because they can think of many reasons to support it 
(or no reason not to support it), and in turn, the endorsed position can facilitate retrieval 
of supporting reasons and thus make such reasons increasingly available. He also argued  
people fail to consider alternatives to a hypothesis because plausible alternatives and 
arguments supporting these alternatives do not spontaneously come to mind. Such 
discussion is consistent with studies on topic belief change previously reviewed. For 
example, Murphy and Alexander (2004) argued strong arguments which foster belief 
change are usually causal or explanatory in nature, which presumably makes the 
alternative belief plausible. Therefore, a remedy to confirmation bias in argumentation 
may debias in two ways—one by making belief-inconsistent arguments more available 
and the other by cognitively engaging individuals in a way that makes the plausibility of 
belief-inconsistent argument more prominent to them. 
Slusher and Anderson (1996) examined the effects of the availability of causal 
explanation on belief change on scientific topics. They hypothesized providing causal 
arguments may directly shift the balance of available explanations in favor of the right 
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belief and thus lead to desirable belief change. They also posited  causal arguments are 
less likely to be discounted, as what biased belief holders usually do when evaluating 
refuting arguments. Their results showed causal arguments produced the greatest belief 
change, and the availability of such arguments mediated this effect. In addition, they also 
found causal arguments were less subject to biased evaluation. These effects were present 
three weeks after the experiment session. Relevant to the proposed research, it is worth 
noting Slusher and Anderson explicitly connected their research to elaborative 
interrogation, suggesting elaborative interrogation could be used to facilitate learning of 
belief-inconsistent content by prompting the generation of causal explanation of belief-
inconsistent content. In other words, self-constructed causal explanation in response to 
elaborative interrogation questions can make explanations of belief-inconsistent content 
more available and less likely to be discounted.  
Similarly, Arkes (1991) reviewed findings on explanation bias—the tendency to 
believe an event is more likely to happen after providing causal explanations on why the 
occurrence of such event is plausible. Explanation bias is present even when individuals 
are well aware the event they explain is completely hypothetical. For example, Anderson 
and Sechler (1986) found explaining why two variables might be related produced an 
increased belief in the explanatory account generated for the hypothetical relationship 
and an increased use of such account. They also found such explanation bias was 
remediable by debiasing effects produced by a counter-explanation task. Further, they 
found beliefs induced by self-generated explanation did not lead to biased evaluation of 
new data and presentation of new data showing no relation between the variables 
moderated the explanation-induced beliefs. 
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As a potential effect of explanation bias, answering or attempting to answer “why” 
questions about belief-inconsistent arguments could possibly change the imbalance 
between high explanation availability on the side of a controversial topic an individual 
takes versus low explanation availability on the side the individual objects to. It also 
could help belief holders understand the plausibility of belief-inconsistent arguments by 
prompting them to generate a causal account of their plausibility. As a result, 
argumentation can likely be improved to be less belief-biased and contains more 
sophisticated coordination of arguments and counterargument based on thorough 
understanding of the latter. Also, the improved argumentation may lead to belief change 
or belief retention on a better justified basis.   
 Simulation heuristics as peripheral processing. Confirmation bias has been 
shown to be partially attributable to automatic processing primed by heuristics from 
memory content, which are made available and prominent by existing beliefs (Kunda, 
1990). An instance of such heuristic cues has been reviewed by Arkes (1991). That is, 
after individuals imagine experiencing an event, they tend to rate the event as more likely 
to occur than do individuals who do not imagine it. The imagination of experiencing an 
event alone does not constitute any evidence on the likelihood of the event. However, 
imagination may have provided a mental simulation of the event. At the peripheral 
processing level, such simulation may serve as a heuristic that cues the likelihood of the 
event and thus increases a belief on the likelihood.  
Heuristics also can be externally produced in favor of belief-inconsistent content 
to attenuate the biasing effect of belief-consistent heuristics. Galinsky and Moskowitz 
(2000), for instance, examined the impact of exposure to counterfactual scenarios on 
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subsequent behavior and judgment. They found exposure to counterfactual scenarios can 
bias or debias thought and action by increasing the accessibility of relevant alternatives. 
Further, they discussed  such scenarios can prime a mental simulation mind-set which can 
be transferred to other problem solving or social judgment contexts. Along this line, Hirt, 
Kardes, and Markman (2004) tested whether having participants generate alternatives can 
produce a mental simulation mind-set which debiases judgments in unrelated domain. 
They found when participants perceived alternative generation tasks as easy to perform, 
the debiasing effect of such tasks was transferable both across task contexts within the 
same domain and across different domains.  
It could be argued  when individuals are asked to answer elaborative interrogation 
questions to justify the belief-inconsistent arguments, they may need to activate a 
scenario portraying the hypothetical truthfulness of the arguments in the first place in 
order to explain why the arguments may make sense. Such a scenario could serve as a 
mental simulation which provides heuristics for subsequent peripheral processing 
underlying argumentation and belief change or retention. Congruent with this speculation, 
Wood et al. (1992) found participants in the elaborative interrogation condition 
consistently used more imagery strategies than did the control participants, suggesting 
elaborative interrogation may induce some kind of mental simulation as speculated above. 
Perhaps more importantly, the mental simulation heuristic may neutralize the belief-
based confirmation bias against belief-inconsistent arguments. It is also possible such 
mental simulation primes memory search in favor of belief-inconsistent content and thus 
corrects biased memory search preferential to prior beliefs. As a result, memory content 
accessed during argumentation and belief change/retention would become more balanced 
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on both sides of the controversial issue because of increased accessibility of belief-
inconsistent content.  
An Adapted Version of Elaborative Interrogation 
Although elaborative interrogation has been studied in relation to learning of both 
single facts and prose messages, it relies in its essence on an explanation of the 
association between two items and seems most readily applicable for learning 
information that having a relatively simple structure. As will be recalled, the basic 
structure of an argument consists of two components: a claim and evidence/reason. Thus, 
elaborative interrogation questions on the argument could be worded as “Why do you 
think the evidence/reasons support the claim?” Even in their simplest form, however, 
arguments contain more information than sentences stating a fact. Thus, to avoid 
cognitive overload, an elaborative interrogation question on an argument should not 
repeat the content of the claim and the evidence/reason in the same way an elaborative 
interrogation question on a single fact repeats the two items and their association as stated 
in the to-be-learned fact. Thus, when elaborative interrogation is utilized to help 
individuals understand and explain an argument, individuals may need additional 
cognitive support to represent the structure of the argument as well as content of the 
claim and evidence or reasons. Thus, an elaborative interrogation strategy was adapted 
for the current proposed research. 
Shaw (1996) argued  three criteria can be applied to evaluate informal arguments. 
The first is an evaluation of whether the premises and conclusions are true, while the 
second is an evaluation of the relationship between the premises and conclusions to 
determine whether the argument is valid. The third criterion is a higher-order evaluation, 
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namely an assessment of how well the argument addresses relevant information on both 
sides of the topic. Shaw argued  the first two criteria must be based on separate 
representation of premises versus conclusions. She also reasoned  improving 
representations of relationships between premises and conclusions may help people 
generate more valid arguments and counterarguments.  
Shaw (1996) also presented experimental evidence suggesting (1) participants did 
not make the distinction between claim and evidence spontaneously; and (2) having 
participants identify premises and conclusions had the effect of improving their 
performance on formulating rebuttals to the arguments. Therefore, in the current research, 
an elaborative interrogation strategy was adapted by incorporating a prompt related to 
identification of claims as well as one for identifying evidence/reasons. Chapter 3 
provides more detail on the adapted elaborative interrogation strategy and how it was 
administered in the actual experiment.  
Adapting elaborative interrogation strategies may also increase the likelihood of 
belief change by mitigating the difficulty individuals might experience when processing 
belief-inconsistent arguments. To account for the mixed evidence on effects of the 
strategy “consider-the-opposite” to remedy belief-induced bias, Schwarz et al. (2007) 
conducted an illuminating study on how individuals’ subjective experiences on an 
alternative-generation task—which prompts individuals to list alternatives to their 
existing beliefs on a topic—mediated the debiasing effects of such tasks. As shown by 
Schwarz et al.’s findings, if participants had difficulty coming up with alternatives (e.g., 
when they are asked to list twelve alternatives), their prior beliefs tended to become even 
stronger after working on the task. In contrast, participants tended to change their beliefs 
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when they perceived generation of alternatives as easy after working on the task (e.g., 
when they are asked to list only three alternatives). Such findings also are consistent with 
those of Hirt et al. (2004), who found ease or difficulty of subjective experiences in 
generating alternatives affected belief change outcome.  
Schwarz et al. (2007) also conceptualized a specific type of metacognitive 
experiences termed “processing fluency”, which they argued are applicable to situations 
where individuals are exposed to belief-inconsistent content. According to this 
perspective, processing fluency is high when individuals perceive belief-inconsistent 
information as easy to process and low when they perceive such information as difficult 
to understand. In the case of argument processing, processing fluency refers to the ease of 
representing and connecting information contained in an argument. Incorporating a 
prompt on the identification of claims versus evidence/reasons of belief-inconsistent 
arguments may increase the processing fluency individuals experience when trying to 
understand these arguments. Thus, the adapted elaborative interrogation may produce 
greater likelihood of individuals’ reflective belief change after reading belief-inconsistent 
arguments than merely having them respond to “why” questions on the arguments. 
In sum, the adapted elaborative interrogation in the present study consisted of two 
types of questions. Questions of the first type constituted a prompt for separately 
identifying the claim and evidence/reasons contain in a belief-inconsistent argument. 
Questions of the second type constituted a prompt for explaining the relationship between 
the claim and its evidence/reasons. Based on previous discussion, adapted elaborative 
interrogation can likely optimize individuals’ transactions with belief-inconsistent 
arguments. Thus, improved quality of argumentation and reflective belief change is 
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expected to be observed after reading belief-inconsistent arguments and responding to 
adapted elaborative interrogation questions.  
This section of the current chapter has provided a review of the literature on 
elaborative interrogation effects on factual and other types of learning. It also has 
outlined likely cognitive mechanisms underlying elaborative interrogation, and connected 
these mechanisms to cognitive causes of confirmation bias. Based on the reviews and 
discussions, an argument is presented  elaborative interrogation has the potential to 
remedy confirmation bias and improve quality of argumentation after individuals have 
been exposed to belief-inconsistent arguments. In addition, an adapted version of 
elaborative interrogation is judged likely to facilitate processing basic structure of 
arguments and thereby increase the likelihood of argumentation improvement and 
reflective belief change.  
However, belief-holders’ own capabilities and inclinations as knowledge builders 
may also need to be considered. For instance, individuals’ motivation to engage in deep 
processing of content they disagree with may affect (1) how well they understand belief-
inconsistent arguments and construct rebuttal to them; and (2) how well they react to the 
adapted elaborative interrogation. This so-called need for cognition is a cognitive 
motivation construct which has been shown to have a significant relationship to how 
individuals process information and thus seems likely to affect quality of argumentation 
as well as the effectiveness of elaborative interrogation. The next section reviews 
literature on need for cognition and discusses how it can affect argumentation and might 
interact with elaborative interrogation. 
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Need for Cognition 
Need for cognition was conceptualized by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) as a 
personality trait which reflects individuals’ motivation to engage in effortful thinking. 
Extant literature on need for cognition has provided evidence on its relationship to both 
cognitive processes and outcomes, such as level of information processing (e.g., 
McAuliff & Kovera, 2008; Stayman & Kardes, 1992), argumentation (e.g., Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003), and belief change (e.g., 
Bradley III & Meeds, 2004; Gibbons, Busch, & Bradac, 1991). Studies like these have 
shown individuals with high need for cognition tend to be more motivated to argue for 
their position, better able to objectively evaluate the quality of argumentation, and less 
likely to demonstrate belief polarization when instructed to reflect on their beliefs.  
Effects of Need for Cognition on Learning Process and Outcome 
Since need for cognition reflects individuals’ tendency to enjoy intellectually 
challenging activities, individuals with high need for cognition generally will be highly 
motivated to engage in deep information processing and higher-order learning. Research 
evidence has shown individuals with high need for cognition are more interested than low 
need for cognition individuals in complex and challenging information (e.g., Worthington, 
2008). As a result, these individuals are more likely to demonstrate desirable learning 
processes and belief outcomes than do individuals with low need for cognition. For 
example, Kuo, Horng, Lin, and Lee (2012) found high need for cognition was associated 
with better recall. As far as higher-order learning is concerned, Stayman and Kardes 
(1992) found individuals with high need for cognition also tended to engage more in 
inference making. In addition, Mahoney and Kaufman (1997) found participants with 
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high need for cognition had significantly fewer irrational beliefs than participants with 
low scores. 
Perhaps most importantly for the current study, high need for cognition also 
seems to be associated with processing of true merit of the to-be-learned information, 
whereas low need for cognition is associated with processing of surface heuristics of 
information being considered. For instance, Vidrine, Simmons, and Brandon (2007) 
found participants with high need for cognition were more likely to process the fact-
based message, whereas individuals with low need for cognition were more likely to react 
to the emotion-based message. Likewise, Nettelhorst and Youmans (2012) found 
participants with low need for cognition were more likely to change their attitude when 
exposed to surface features of a product, whereas participants with high need for 
cognition were more likely to change their attitude when exposed to substantive features.  
Need for Cognition and Argumentation 
Because high need for cognition is associated with higher level of information 
processing, it is more likely individuals with high need for cognition will examine 
arguments and beliefs on a more objective basis. Research findings have suggested 
individuals with high need for cognition do in fact tend to examine arguments more 
carefully and are more likely to detect flaws in arguments. McAuliff and Kovera (2008), 
for instance, found jurors with higher need for cognition were more likely to notice the 
methodological flaws contained in expert evidence then were jurors with low need for 
cognition. Moreover, it also seems individuals with high need for cognition tend to form 
their beliefs more carefully and are more likely to accurately evaluate the nature of 
available evidence. For example, Kardash and Scholes (1996) found conclusions 
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generated by individuals with high need for cognition were more likely to be accurate 
about the tentative nature of the mixed evidence to which they were exposed.  
As need for cognition is by nature a cognitive motivation construct, individuals 
with high need for cognition may be more motivated to argue for their stances on 
controversial topics. For example, Nussbaum and Bendixen (2003) found participants 
with high need for cognition tended to engage in social arguments or debates. Further, 
given that need for cognition has been empirically shown to be associated with deep 
processing, it is also possible individuals with high need for cognition have the habit in 
their daily lives of thinking deeply about controversial topics, as well as thoroughly 
examining information relevant to such topics. Thus, individuals with high need for 
cognition may be both more motivated and better able to elaborate on their positions on 
controversial topics, as compared to individuals with low need for cognition.  
Need for Cognition and Effects of Elaborative Interrogation 
As previously described, need for cognition has been shown to relate to learning 
in general, as well as to the processes and outcomes of argumentation in particular. Thus, 
it is possible individuals with high versus low need for cognition also will react 
differently to use of an elaborative interrogation strategy, a strategy designed to facilitate 
deep and unbiased information processing in this propose research.  
Elaborative interrogation likely affects learning based on several mechanisms 
previously discussed. For instance, whether elaborative interrogation can lead to learning 
gains depends in part on how much prior knowledge learners possess on the to-be-learned 
topic. The more topic knowledge learners possess, the more knowledge will be likely 
activated by use of elaborative interrogation, which then contributes to learning. Because 
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of a general tendency to attend to topic relevant information, individuals with high need 
for cognition may possess more topic knowledge to be activated by use of elaborative 
interrogation. In addition, individuals with high need for cognition may search their prior 
knowledge more thoroughly than those with low need for cognition when answering 
elaborative interrogation questions. As a result, individuals with high need for cognition 
may be more likely to benefit from use of elaborative interrogation. As far as 
argumentation is concerned, individuals with high need for cognition may both have 
more topic knowledge to be activated by use of elaborative interrogation and be more 
motivated to search their prior knowledge to respond to the elaborative interrogation 
questions. As a result, individuals with high need for cognition may demonstrate greater 
gains in quality of argumentation after using elaborative interrogation to process belief-
inconsistent arguments, as compared to individuals with low need for cognition. 
On the other hand, however, it could be argued  individuals with high need for 
cognition will process the belief-inconsistent arguments no matter whether they use the 
strategy of elaborative interrogation or not. Thus, using elaborative interrogation likely 
will not contribute much to the improvement of argumentation for individuals with high 
need for cognition. In this sense, individuals with low need for cognition may be more 
likely to benefit from use of elaborative interrogation. 
In sum, based on prior research, it seems very likely need for cognition will be 
positively related to quality of argumentation. It is also likely, however, an interaction 
between need for cognition and the use of elaborative interrogation seems likely in their 
effects on the quality of argumentation after reading belief-inconsistent arguments. At the 
same time, however, it is unclear what specific direction such interaction will take. That 
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is, it is possible participants with high need for cognition would benefit more from using 
elaborative interrogation as compared to those with low need for cognition, but the 
opposite is also possible. The third research question posed at the end of Chapter 1 thus 
focused on (1) examining the relationship between need for cognition and quality of 
argumentation, and (2) exploring a possible interaction between need for cognition and 
elaborative interrogation on affecting argumentation.  
The Need for Cognition Scale (NFC), developed and refined by Cacioppo and colleagues 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), is used to measure individuals’ 
level of need for cognition. The NFC is designed to measure how much individuals 
enjoys intellectually challenging situations and whether they are motivated to engage in 
effortful cognitive activities on a five-point Likert-type scale shown to have a single-
factor structure (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). An example item is: “I would 
prefer complex to simple problems.” Higher agreement with this item indicates higher 
need for cognition. Another example item is: “Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite 
me very much.” Higher agreement with this item indicates lower need for cognition. 
At this point, relevant studies on argumentation, belief change, confirmation bias, 
elaborative interrogation, and need for cognition have been examined. To answer the 
three research questions on relationships among these variables as posed at the end of 
Chapter 1, several key questions on methods of this research were addressed first in two 
pilot studies. These questions included the following. What reading materials are most 
appropriate for addressing this study’s research questions? Similarly, what measures of 
the dependent variables—quality of argumentation and topic beliefs—are likely to be 
most appropriate for examining effects of elaborative interrogation and need for 
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cognition on these dependent variables? Furthermore, what research procedures are most 
likely to provide the most trustworthy evidence about the effects of elaborative 
interrogation on argumentation and topic beliefs? In the next section, brief description of 
the methods and results from two pilot studies and their relationship to relevant prior 
research are presented and discussed. 
Pilot Studies 
This section reviews two pilot studies conducted to refine the focus and 
methodology of the primary study of this dissertation research. The following two 
subsections summarize methodological question(s) addressed by the pilot studies, 
methods of each pilot study, and relevant findings from each. Based on the 
implementation and results of these studies, decisions about methods to be used in the 
main study were made.  
Pilot Study 1 
Pilot Study 1 questions. The reading materials used in this research was based on 
a controversial topic in a social domain. The rationale for using controversial topics in a 
social domain involves the complexity and bias-conducive nature of reasoning in such 
domains. Argumentation in a social domain is usually complicated and both children and 
adults reason more poorly in a social domain (Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 
1995). Since some social topics are more controversial than others, it was important to 
make sure materials used in the current study were based on a truly controversial social 
topic and functioned well in the experimental context. Thus, Pilot Study 1 was conducted 
to test whether reading materials based on an initially considered topic would actually be 
controversial from the standpoint of the likely college-age participants.  
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Methods. The topic initially considered for this study came from an article and 
comments on the article published in The New York Times on whether algebra should be 
required for students at the level of secondary education (Hacker, 2012). The original 
article and comments on it were edited by the present researcher into six arguments 
favoring mandated algebra and six arguments against mandated algebra. All arguments 
were of approximately equal length. All arguments were structured in the same way, with 
a claim followed by a reason or evidence supporting the claim. These arguments were 
presented via an online survey to a group of 26 students from an undergraduate 
educational psychology class in a large Midwestern university. These participants were 
provided with a link to an online survey containing all of the twelve arguments. After 
reading each argument, participants were asked to rate how persuasive the argument was 
on a five-point Likert-type scale item. After reading all arguments, participants were 
prompted to reflect on the arguments and report their own stance on the topic by 
indicating whether they thought algebra should continue to be required at the secondary 
education level or not.  
Results. Results from Pilot Study 1 showed: (1) only 2 of the twenty-six 26 
participants took the position against mandated algebra at secondary education; and (2) 
participants judged the arguments favoring mandated algebra at secondary education to 
be significantly more persuasive than the arguments on the opposite side. These results 
thus clearly showed the algebra topic, as viewed by undergraduate participants, was not 
sufficiently controversial for the purpose of this research.  
Decisions about conducting the current research. Based on results of Pilot 
Study 1, materials on the topic of whether or not algebra should be required at secondary 
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level were eliminated from further study. A second set of materials was then considered, 
which was based on the topic of whether the state should adopt the Common Core State 
Standards for Mathematics (National Governors Association Center for Best Practices & 
Council of Chief State School Officers, 2010). Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics (referred to as CCSS-M below) are designed based on excellent state 
standard by experienced teachers, content experts, and state governors and leaders, for a 
purpose to address the problem of curriculum which covers a wide range of topics in a 
shallow manner. CCSS-M clearly specifies what a student should know and be able to do 
in mathematics at the end of each grade, which is K-8, and at the end of high school 
(grades 9-12). CCSS-M was launched in 2010 () and is currently adopted by 42 states of 
the United States and not adopted by the remaining 8 states (Common Core State 
Standards Initiatives, 2016; Standards in Your State, 2016).  
At both the state and national level, however, there has been considerable 
disagreement over whether CCSS-M will, if implemented, be effective in improving 
mathematics learning. Thus, the topic of whether the state should adopt CCSS-M was 
judged to be more controversial than the algebra topic tested in Pilot Study 1. Whether 
the CCSS-M topic was actually controversial from the standpoint of college-age 
participants was tested in Pilot Study 2, along with several design, measurement, and 
procedural features used in the current research. 
Pilot Study 2 
Pilot study 2 questions. The purpose of Pilot Study 2 was to test whether the 
overall design, reading materials and measures could effectively address the research 
questions previously posed. Specially, Pilot Study 2 was designed to inform decisions 
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about four design-related questions. (1) are reading materials based on the CCSS-M 
Topic sufficiently controversial and appropriate for the research purpose of examining 
effects of elaborative interrogation on argumentation and belief change? (2) what kind of 
scoring rubric is sufficiently reliable and appropriate to measure quality of argumentation 
as an outcome likely affected by using elaborative interrogation to process belief-
inconsistent arguments? (3) is the methodological approach of exposing participants to 
only belief-inconsistent arguments an effective way to maximize the likelihood of 
argumentation improvement and belief change? and (4) is a measure of topic beliefs 
developed by the present researcher sufficiently reliable and valid? The rationale for the 
design of materials, measures, and procedures is discussed below, followed by a review 
of the methods and relevant results of Pilot Study 2. 
Using simple-structure arguments on the CCSS-M topic. As previously 
discussed, the CCSS-M topic was judged by the researcher to be controversial from the 
standpoint of the college-age participants who would participate in the planned study, and 
each argument should be constructed in ways reflecting the basic structure of argument, 
consisting of a claim followed by evidence/reasons in support of the claim. Choice of 
such material design was based on two reasons. First, reading a group of short, mutually 
independent arguments was judged to be likely to reduce extraneous cognitive load which 
would be generated by having to identify each argument from a complicated prose 
message which integrates multiple arguments. Second, elaborative interrogation is a 
strategy most often applied to process the association between two items (see a review by 
Pressley et al., 1992), suggesting the argument structure simplified into a claim plus 
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evidence/reason format may be most appropriate for testing the effectiveness of 
elaborative interrogation.  
Judging potential argumentation scoring rubrics. The literature on 
argumentation research has provided a variety of ways to assess quality of argumentation. 
However, most scoring rubrics from prior studies can be grouped into two types based on 
whether the assessment scoring is based on (1) a continuous scale or (2) number of 
dichotomous checks. Studies using scoring rubrics of the first type evaluated quality of 
different aspects of argumentation on a continuous scale. For example, Hand and Choi 
(2010) assessed argumentation on a ten-point scale in terms of how well claims and 
evidence are connected and how coherent the flow of an argument is. Likewise, Tawfik 
and Jonassen (2013) assessed argumentation on a five-point scale based on the degree of 
consistency among claim, counter claim, and rebuttal, and the degree of specificity of the 
explanation or elaboration on the claim, while Braten, Ferguson, Strømsø, and 
Anmarkrud (2014) assessed argumentation on a seven-point scale based on how well 
opposing perspectives are discussed and elaborated, and how consistent and relevant an 
argument is.  
There are only a few studies which have used the second type of scoring rubric, 
which applies a sequence of dichotomous check to assign a final score to an 
argumentation (e.g., Sampton & Clark, 2008, 2009). For instance, Sampton and Clark 
(2009) adopted a scoring rubric based on a number of dichotomous checks on a hierarchy 
of argumentation features. In their approach, for instance, a “yes or no” question is asked 
from the top of the hierarchy (e.g., “Does the explanation have any facet scored as 
inaccurate?”) and moving toward the bottom of the hierarchy (e.g., “Does the explanation 
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have any facets scored as incomplete?”). The final score of quality of argumentation was 
dependent on the number of “yes” responses to all dichotomous checks. Since responding 
to the “yes or no” question is more clear-cut than grading quality of argumentation on a 
continuous scale, the dichotomous check rubric was expected to be more objective than 
the continuous scale-based rubrics. To evaluate which type of argumentation scoring 
rubric would be most reliable and appropriate for the purpose of this research, two rubrics 
were developed. One rubric was developed based on continuous scale and the other based 
on dichotomous checks. Pilot Study 2 tested both rubrics to determine which one was 
likely more reliable and appropriate for this research.  
Exposure to belief-inconsistent arguments only. Although most prior studies on 
topic-belief change on controversial topics have exposed participants to information from 
both sides of an issue, results from these studies have generally shown minimal belief 
change after reading (e.g. Andiliou et al., 2012; Kunda, 1990; McCrudden & Sparks, 
2014). Beliefs-based confirmation bias on a controversial topic may be in part attributed 
to selective attention to information in favor of one’s own topic position. Thus, exposing 
participants only to belief-inconsistent arguments could be expected to exclusively focus 
their attention on the belief-inconsistent information without interference from the 
attention-grabbing belief-consistent arguments. Moreover, since confirmation bias is 
induced when belief-consistent content is more available and accessible than belief-
inconsistent content (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), exposing participants only to belief-
inconsistent arguments could increase the availability and accessibility of belief-
inconsistent arguments, and therefore favor their unbiased processing. Thus, a design 
which exposed individuals only to belief-inconsistent arguments was judged to make 
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optimal processing of these arguments more likely in the context of using elaborative 
interrogation. Pilot Study 2 tested the power of the above design for detecting the likely 
effects of elaborative interrogation on quality of argumentation and belief change. 
Validation of a measure of topic beliefs. A six-point Likert-type scale consisting 
of twelve items was developed by the researcher for individuals to report their beliefs on 
the CCSS-M topic. The stem of each item was the first sentence (claim) of each argument 
about whether the state should adopt CCSS-M. Six items were designed to measure how 
much participants agree the state should adopt CCSS-M. The other six items were 
designed to measure how much one agreed with the position that the state should not 
adopt CCSS-M. The scale thus theoretically would be expected to contain a pro-CCSS-M 
factor and an anti-CCSS-M factor, and Pilot Study 2 tested the internal consistency 
reliability and construct validity of this scale.  
Methods. One hundred and eight (108) students from four undergraduate 
educational psychology classes participated in Pilot Study 2. These students were drawn 
from the same population as those who would likely participate in the proposed research. 
Reading materials of Pilot Study 2 included six arguments in favor of adopting the 
CCSS-M, and six arguments against adopting it. All arguments were structured in the 
same manner, with a claim followed by a reason or evidence supporting the claim. 
Participants were first introduced to the CCSS-M topic generally and then prompted to 
rate their own position for or against CCSS-M, by using the 12-item, six-point Likert-
type scale previously described. Then they were asked to construct argumentation to 
justify their position on the topic. 
   63 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either an adapted elaborative 
interrogation condition or a summary-control condition. All participants were given six 
arguments to read, which refuted their topic positions. Participants in the adapted 
elaborative interrogation condition answered adapted elaborative interrogation questions 
after reading each argument. Participants in the summary-control condition answered 
summarization and thought-generation questions after reading each argument. After 
reading, all participants were asked to take position on the CCSS-M topic again and 
report their topic beliefs again. At last, they were asked to construct argumentation to 
justify their current position again. 
Two scoring rubrics were developed for assessing quality of argumentation in 
Pilot Study 2. The first scoring rubric was developed based on a continuous scale 
assessing how well claims are supported by evidence and reasons, as well as coherence of 
the entire argumentation. The first rubric assessed quality of argumentation on a four-
point scale as follows, with a general and/or incoherent argument scored as a 1, a 
somewhat specific and coherent argument which contained only limited elaboration 
scored as a 2, a specific and coherent argumentation which contained sufficient 
elaboration scored as a 3, and a specific, coherent, and convincing argumentation which 
contained rich elaboration scored as a 4. To examine whether the first rubric was a 
reliable measure of quality of argumentation, a second rater was trained by the researcher 
on how to use the rubric to score argumentation in order to calculate inter-rater reliability. 
The researcher and the second rater independently scored 44 papers (20.6%) of the whole 
sample which consisted of a pre-test and post-test argumentation for each of the 108 
participants (216 writing samples in total).  
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A second, contrasting rubric was developed based on a sequence of dichotomous 
checks. The content of each step of dichotomous check was based on extant literature on 
assessing argumentation (e.g., Wolfe, 2012; Wolfe & Britt, 2008), which focuses on 
whether claims are supported by evidence/reasons, whether both sides of an issue are 
incorporated, and the adjudged quality of the evidence/reasons. Based on content of 
scoring rubrics of argumentation from prior research, the second rubric made 
dichotomous checks on (1) whether or not there is at least one clear claim in line with the 
topic position taken (Wolfe & Britt 2008); (2) whether or not claim(s) is/are elaborated 
with reason(s) or evidence (Berland & McNeill, 2010; Wolfe, 2012; Wolfe & Britt); (3) 
whether or not the reasons/evidence are relevant and focused (Braten, Ferguson, Strømsø, 
& Anmarkrud, 2014; Sampson & Clark, 2008); (4) whether or not the elaboration 
contains specific examples or involves specific context (Tawfik and Jonassen, 2013); and 
(5) whether or not the opposing position is rebutted (Mateos, Cuevas, Martin, Martin, 
Echeita, & Luna, 2011; Wolfe; Wolfe & Britt).  
The five dichotomous checks were made in the order as numbered above. The 
score assigned to each argumentation was the number of “yes” responses to these checks, 
resulting in a possible score range of 0 to 5. For the second rubric, the researcher trained 
another rater who had not been exposed to the first rubric and the argumentation data 
before. The researcher and the new second rater independently scored 44 papers (20.6% 
of the whole sample). Both second raters were doctoral students with background 
knowledge in CCSS-M and were familiar with the reading materials used. Both second 
raters were blind to the condition information, subject ID, and pre and post information 
when scoring. 
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Results. In Pilot Study 2, 44 out of 108 participants (40.7%) took a pro-Common 
Core position, while the remaining 64 participants (59.3%) took an anti-Common Core 
position. This result showed the CCSS-M topic was in fact likely controversial, from the 
standpoint of the likely college-age participants of the proposed research. Intraclass 
correlations (ICC) were calculated for scorings based on the first rubric and for scorings 
bases on the second rubric. The ICC results showed the first rubric scorings had inter-
rater reliability judged as moderate (ICC < .6), whereas the second rubric scorings had 
excellent inter-rater reliability, (ICC > .8), as judged by current ICC literature (e.g., 
Hallgren, 2012; van Ness, Towle, & Juthani-Mehta, 2008). In addition, based on the 
second rubric, which has a score range of six points, scorings from the two raters agreed 
completely on 23 (52.3%) of the 44 papers, and disagreed by 1 point on the remaining 
papers. There were no disagreements larger than 2 points. In general, these results were 
taken as indicating that scorings generated based on the second rubric would be more 
reliable than those based on the first rubric and thus more appropriate for the purpose of 
the proposed research. 
Data analyses based on the second rubric showed: (1) participants in the 
elaborative interrogation condition demonstrated significantly greater gains in quality of 
argumentation after reading belief-inconsistent arguments, as compared to participants in 
the summary-control condition; (2) topic beliefs of participants in the elaborative 
interrogation condition generally became less extreme and more balanced, and (3) topic 
beliefs of participants in the summary-control condition did not change. These results 
suggested the methodological design of exposing participants to belief-inconsistent 
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arguments of simple structure likely would have enough power for the purpose of 
primary research study.   
Results of Pilot Study 2 also showed the six-point Likert-type scale measure of 
beliefs on the CCSS-M topic developed by the researcher based on claims from the 
arguments on this topic had sufficient internal consistency reliability and construct 
validity, with confirmatory factor analysis showing an acceptable model fit for a two-
factor structure of the scale (SRMR = .068, RMSEA = .074, CFI = .930). Cronbach’s α 
was .878 for the pro-CCSS-M factor, and .886 for the anti-CCSS-M factor. Since one of 
the items in the original scale made the model unable to converge, it was dropped and the 
scale administered in the main study only contains 11 items.  
Decisions about conducting the current research. Several methodological 
decisions tied to the questions previously posed were also made on the basis of Pilot 
Study 2 results. First, the CCSS-M topic was selected and the reading materials were 
comprised of simple-structure arguments (a claims followed by a supporting 
evidence/reason) on the topic of whether the state should adopt CCSS-M or not. Second, 
a scoring rubric based on five steps of dichotomous checks was used to assess 
argumentation quality. Third, participants were only exposed to arguments inconsistent 
with their beliefs on the CCSS-M topic. Fourth, the researcher-developed six-point 
Likert-type scale tested in Pilot Study 2 was used in this research to measure individuals’ 
beliefs on the CCSS-M topic.  
Research Hypotheses 
Based on previous review of relevant literature, it seemed likely elaborative 
interrogation would have effects of improving argumentation and leading to reflective 
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belief change, by correcting biased process of belief-inconsistent arguments. It also was 
judged likely individuals’ need for cognition would be positively related to quality of 
argumentation and might interact with elaborative interrogation. Based on results from 
the two pilot studies, the reading materials, overall design, and measures tested also seem 
likely to be sufficiently sensitive to detect effects of elaborative interrogation on 
argumentation and belief change, as well as the potential role of need for cognition. Thus, 
the following three hypotheses corresponding to the three research questions posed in 
Chapter 1 were proposed.  
Hypothesis 1: For participants in the elaborative interrogation condition, quality 
of argumentation in support of their topic position/beliefs will improve after 
reading belief-inconsistent arguments. In contrast, participants in the control 
conditions will not show such improvement.  
Elaborative interrogation has been shown to improve associative and inferential 
learning involved in understanding belief-inconsistent arguments. Several mechanisms 
suggest these outcomes. First, elaborative interrogation seems to activate prior knowledge 
and other memory content consistent with the associations and inferences contained in 
the arguments by engaging participants in deep processing. Second, elaborative 
interrogation may induce a mental simulation of the to-be-processed arguments and thus 
contribute to the understanding of the plausibility of the arguments from the perspective 
of arguers on the sides opposing participants’ topic positions. Third, the adapted 
elaborative interrogation incorporates a prompt for identifying claims and 
evidence/reasons of the arguments separately, which may facilitate the processing of 
structure of the arguments and thus add to participants’ subjective ease of processing 
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belief-inconsistent arguments. Considering all these possible mechanisms together, the 
adapted elaborative interrogation can likely combat confirmation biases that undermine 
understanding of belief-inconsistent arguments. As a result, as compared with 
participants’ in the control condition, elaborative interrogation may be expected to 
improve participants’ ability to elaborate on their topic positions and integrate and rebut 
belief-inconsistent arguments based on thorough and accurate understanding of such 
arguments.  
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the adapted elaborative interrogation condition will 
be more likely to change their beliefs on the topic toward a more balanced and 
less extreme direction than those in the control conditions. 
Since the process of argumentation is conceived of as the cognitive basis for topic 
belief change or retention, improved argumentation should result in more comprehensive 
and rational views on the topic based on optimal understanding of arguments from both 
sides of the issue. Therefore, adapted elaborative interrogation is expected to change 
participants’ topic beliefs toward a more balanced and less extreme direction, as 
compared with participants’ in the control conditions.  
Hypothesis 3: Participants with higher need for cognition, as measured by the 
Need for Cognition Scale, will demonstrate higher quality of argumentation 
overall. There will be an interaction between need for cognition and adapted 
elaborative interrogation on improving quality of argumentation. 
Since high need for cognition has been found to be associated with deep 
information processing, objective evaluation of evidence, and motivation to approach 
argumentation, participants with high need for cognition are expected to demonstrate 
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higher quality of argumentation. At the same time, participants with different levels of 
need for cognition are expected to benefit differentially from the adapted elaborative 
interrogation to improve their argumentation on the controversial topic. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the methods used in the current 
research. It describes the participants, materials, measures, and methods, the examination 
of treatment implementation, and the procedures used in this research. In general, this 
study used a mixed model pretest-posttest experimental design with random assignment 
to three experimental conditions (elaborative interrogation treatment condition, summary 
control condition, and no-processing control condition) to test the three hypotheses posed. 
All participants were only exposed to reading arguments on a topic position opposing the 
topic position they reported at pretest. Data analysis methods utilized in the research are 
briefly described at the chapter’s conclusion. 
Participants 
Participants of this research were 118 students enrolled in two undergraduate 
educational psychology courses in a Midwestern university. These participants were from 
the same population of participants of Pilot Studies 1 and 2. These two courses have a 
research participation requirement, which students can fulfill either by participating in 
research studies or writing summaries of educational psychology research articles. 
Participants of this research were given research credits for compensation. The average 
age of the participants was 21 years (SD = 2.73). The majority (80%) of the participants 
were female (n = 92). The majority (86%) of the participants reported their ethnicity as 
Caucasian (n = 102), with others reporting their ethnicities as African American (n = 2), 
Asian (n = 1), Latino (n = 3) and multiracial (n = 4). Six participants chose not to report 
their ethnicity. Fifty-one (51) of the participants (43%) were juniors, 36 were sophomores 
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(31%), 30 were seniors (24%), and there was only 1 freshman. The majority (65%) of the 
participants were majoring in education (n = 77).  
A power analysis was conducted with effect size derived based on findings from 
the second pilot study, which was larger but comparable to the effect sizes reported in the 
elaborative interrogation literature. The result indicated a sample size as large as 108 
participants likely could make a beta value of 0.9 available for the current research, while 
the lower bound of acceptable beta for social science studies is 0.8. Therefore, the 
eventual sample size was judged sufficient for the purpose of the current study.  
Materials 
Arguments on the CCSS-M topic were adapted by the researcher from 
argumentative essays written by in-service mathematics teachers to fulfill an assignment 
in a graduate-level professional development course at the author’s university1. Content 
from these essays were reorganized and reworded to form six arguments supporting 
adopting the CCSS-M (The Pro-Math Common Core Arguments), and six arguments 
against adopting the CCSS-M (The Anti-Math Common Core Arguments), see Appendix 
A. All arguments were structured in the same way, with a claim followed by a reason or 
evidence supporting the claim. The Pro-Math Common Core Arguments consisted of six 
arguments, with a total of 598 words. The Anti-Math Common Core Arguments 
consisted of six arguments, with a total of 594 words. 
                                                            
1
 Classroom materials used with permission of Dr. Wendy Smith of the Center for Science, 
Mathematics & Computer Education, University of Nebraska-Lincoln  
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Measures 
Self-Reported Topic Position and Argumentation Construction Prompt 
The Educational Topic Position and Rationale Questionnaire, which was designed 
by the author (see Appendix B), provided questions and prompts for participants to report 
their positions on the CCSS-M topic. This questionnaire consisted of a pre- and post-
experiment version (see Appendix B), the wordings of which differed slightly. The pre-
test questionnaire began with a two-paragraph written introduction to the CCSS-M topic. 
Following their reading of this introduction, participants were asked to take a position on 
the CCSS-M topic by indicating whether they thought the state should adopt the 
Common Core State Standards for Mathematics. Participants then were asked to write 
down the point(s) they judged to provide them with the best support for justifying the 
positions they had taken. The post-experiment questionnaire began with a prompt for 
participants to reflect on their reading of the belief-inconsistent arguments. Participants 
then were asked to report their current topic positions. In the end, the questionnaire 
prompted participants to construct argumentation to justify their current positions one 
more time. 
Scoring Rubric of Quality of Argumentation 
The Five-Step-Dichotomous Check Rubric tested in Pilot Study 2 was slightly 
modified and used to assess quality of argumentation. Raters using this rubric made a 
series of sequential judgments on whether or not an argumentation possessed each of four 
features in the numerical order below. 
(1) Whether there was at least one clear claim supporting the topic position taken? 
(2) Whether the claim(s) was/were elaborated with reasons or evidence?  
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(3) Whether the reasons/evidence was/were relevant and focused?  
(4) Whether the elaboration contains specific examples or specific context? 
The dichotomous check concluded whenever the answer to a question was “no”. 
Also, if the response to (1) was “yes,” raters checked whether or not the argumentation 
possessed some rebuttals to the opposing position.  
After all five dichotomous checks were completed, a final score was assigned to 
the argumentation. The final score was the total number of “yes” responses to all 
dichotomous check questions. All argumentation scores ranged from 0 to 5. Figure 1 
illustrates the detail of each step of dichotomous check in the rubric.  
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The researcher was the primary rater, with a second rater trained by the researcher 
on how to use the rubric to score argumentation. Each of the 118 people produced 2 sets 
of arguments: pre-test and post-test argumentation. One participant’s responses were 
excluded because the post-test argumentation was missing, so the whole writing sample 
consisted of 234 argumentations. The two raters scored 21% (n = 50) of the whole sample 
(n = 234) independently for a reliability check. Twenty-five (25) of the inter-rater sample 
came from the pre-test argumentation, and 25 came from the post-test argumentation. 
Both raters were blind to participant identification and condition information when 
scoring. After independent scoring, the two raters discussed the scoring results and 
resolved some conflicts, with intraclass correlation used as the index of inter-rater 
reliability. Since the intraclass correlation between the two raters’ scoring for single 
measure was .845 and is generally considered to be sufficient for empirical studies in the 
social sciences, (e.g., see Hallgren, 2012), only the primary rater’s scoring was used in 
subsequent data analyses. 
Measure of Topic Beliefs 
An Educational Topic Belief Scale (see Appendix C) was used to measure 
participants’ beliefs on the CCSS-M topic in both pre-test and post-test. This scale 
consisted of eleven statements and each statement came from the first sentence (claim) of 
each of the eleven arguments on Math Common Core, which were from the reading 
materials used in this study. The reading materials consisted of 12 arguments, but the 
statement from one argument was dropped from the scale the corresponding item’s low 
loading on the two factors of the scale. This scale was designed to measure how much an 
individual agrees with each belief central to this topic on a six-point Likert-type scale. As 
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discussed previously, the scale theoretically would be expected to contain a pro-CCSS-M 
factor and an anti-CCSS-M factor. An example item from the pro-CCSS-M factor was 
“Having a national curriculum would be an opportunity for federal and state educational 
dollars to work more efficiently”. An example item from the anti-CCSS-M factor was 
“Adopting a national standard will undermine diversity that is at the very heart of the 
United States”. In the current study, results from confirmative factor analysis did in fact 
show very good model fit for a two-factor structure of the scale (SRMR = .058, RMSEA 
= .053, CFI = .950). Reliability analyses also showed sufficient internal consistency 
within each factor. Cronbach’s alpha was .739 for the five items representing the pro-
CCSS-M factor, and .718 for the six items representing the anti-CCSS-M factor.  
Need for Cognition Measure 
As described previously (see also Appendix D), the Need for Cognition Scale 
(NFC) was designed and refined by Cacioppo and colleagues to measure how much 
individuals enjoys intellectually challenging situations and are motivated to engage in 
effortful cognitive activities on a five-point Likert-type scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Cacioppo et al. (1984) has reported excellent reliability 
(  > .90) and a single-factor structure for this scale. Several studies also have been 
reported in support of the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale (see a review 
by Cacioppo et al., 1996). The short form of NFC, consisting of 18 items, was used in 
this research to measure participants’ need for cognition. An average score of the 18 
items was used as the indicator of participants’ level of need for cognition.  
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Treatment Implementation 
In order to further examine participants’ cognitive effort when reading belief-
inconsistent arguments with versus without using elaborative interrogation, participants 
were asked to report the level of difficulty they experienced when responding to 
questions following each argument, if any. Participants’ subjective difficulty level was 
assessed by themselves on a 10-point scale with 1 being “extremely easy” and 10 being 
“extremely difficult”. Participants’ responses to this question ranged from 1 to 9 points (n 
= 115, M = 4.7, SD = 1.816), indicating a perception of medium difficulty level on 
average. 
Procedures 
To test the three hypotheses proposed for this study, a mixed-model experimental 
design was adopted with a pre-test and a post-test of the two dependent variables, which 
were quality of argumentation and topic beliefs. Participants were randomly assigned to 
three conditions: an adapted elaborative interrogation treatment condition (n = 38), a 
summary-control condition (n = 39) and a no-processing (business-as-usual) control 
condition (n = 40). Responses from one participant out of the 118 participants were 
excluded from the analysis because the post-test argumentation was missing. Participants 
individually completed pre-test measures, arguments reading, question answering, and 
post-test measures on QUALTRICS, a web-based data collection platform (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT), on computers in a quiet computer lab. For all conditions, the data collection 
procedure consisted of four phases and was completed between 1 to 1.5 hours on average. 
Below is a detailed description of the above procedures. Also, Appendix G illustrates the 
procedures with a flowchart. 
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Pre-Test Phase 
Participants first completed the Need for Cognition Scale (Appendix D), 
Education Topic Belief Scale (Appendix C) and then the Pre-Test Topic Position and 
Justification Questionnaire (Appendix B (a)). In response to the Pre-Test Topic Position 
and Justification Questionnaire, they were introduced to the CCSS-M topic, prompted to 
take positions on the topic and construct argumentation to justify their positions. 
Experimental Manipulation Phase 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: an adapted 
elaborative interrogation treatment condition, a summary-control condition, and a no-
processing control condition. Participants were asked to read six arguments which 
opposed the position they just took in the pre-test phase, no matter which condition they 
were assigned to. For instance, participants who took a pro-CCSS-M position read six 
anti-Math Common Core arguments (Appendix A(b)) and those taking an anti-CCSS-M 
position read six pro-Math Common Core arguments (Appendix A(a)). Participants were 
provided with blank sheets for free-form note taking, if they chose to take notes.  
After reading each of the six arguments, participants in the treatment condition 
were asked to respond to a claim versus evidence/reasons identification question (e.g., 
Please briefly identify the claim of Argument 1 and the evidence/reasons used to support 
this claim.) and two elaborative interrogation questions (e.g., Why do you think the 
evidence/reasons supports the claim? Why do you think Argument 1 justifies that the 
state should/should not adopt the Math Common Core?). The full set of questions appear 
in Appendix E. Participants in the summary-control condition were asked to summarize 
the main idea of each argument and write down at least one thought they had when 
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reading each argument (see Appendix F). Participants in the no-processing control 
condition simply read the six arguments without being asked to perform any writing task. 
All participants had access to the arguments and their notes (if any) when responding to 
the questions (if any). 
Post-Test Phase 
After reading and question answering, participants were asked to complete the 
same Education Topic Belief Scale (Appendix C) again and the Post-Test Topic Position 
and Justification Questionnaire (Appendix B(b)). In response to the Post-Test Topic 
Position and Justification Questionnaire, they reported their post-reading topic positions 
and then constructed argumentation to justify their post-reading positions. 
Debriefing phase 
After completing all post-test measures, participants were debriefed on the 
purpose of this study and exposed to the six arguments consistent with their pre-test 
positions on the CCSS-M topic, which they had not had access to before the debriefing 
phase. Participants were also given either the adapted elaborative interrogation questions 
or the summary-control questions, or both of these questions, depending on which 
condition they were in, to make sure all participants had equal access to all materials used 
after completing the experiment.  
Data Analysis 
One-way ANOVA were used to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, for making 
between-group comparisons. A change variable of argumentation was calculated by post-
test argumentation score minus pre-test argumentation score, to examine improvement or 
deterioration in quality of argumentation. Change variables of topic beliefs were also 
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calculated by post-test topic belief scores minus pre-test topic belief scores, to examine 
possible belief change. With regard to Hypothesis 3, correlation analysis was be used to 
examine the relationship between need for cognition and the pre-test quality of 
argumentation. Also, regression analysis with an interaction term between the two 
independent variables, namely experimental condition and need for cognition, will be 
used to examine whether need for cognition interacts with the experimental manipulation 
on affecting quality of argumentation.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The current chapter presents results of the research organized around the three 
research hypotheses previously posed. Additional analyses also are reported in this 
chapter to provide further insights into results which either confirmed or rejected the 
research hypotheses. These additional analyses include analyses of treatment fidelity, 
presence of rebuttal in pretest versus posttest argumentation, and self-reported position 
certainty and topic relevancy. 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 posited participants in the elaborative interrogation condition would 
demonstrate improvement in argumentation quality from pretest to posttest. Table 1 
shows descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest argumentation scores for each 
experimental group. 
Table 1.  
Pretest and Posttest Argumentation Scores by Condition. 
  Pretest  Posttest  
Condition N M SD M SD 
Elaborative Interrogation 38 2.66 1.02 3.05 .93 
Summary Control 39 2.90 1.14 2.69 1.08 
No-Processing Control 40 3.03   .83 2.75 1.03 
Note: N = 117. 
To test whether the random assignment was successful, one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was first performed to compare the pretest argumentation score 
across the elaborative interrogation (EI) treatment group, summary control group, and the 
no-processing control group. There was no significant difference found among the three 
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groups on pretest argumentation score [F (2, 114) = 1.33, p = .27], which can be 
interpreted  the random assignment was successful and the three groups had equivalent 
argumentation writing skills on the CCSS-M topic prior to the experimental manipulation 
as measured by the scoring rubric.  
In order to test Hypothesis 1, the argumentation change score was calculated by 
subtracting each participant’s pretest argumentation score from his/her posttest 
argumentation score. A positive change score indicated improvement in argumentation 
from pretest to posttest, and a negative change score indicated deterioration in 
argumentation from pretest to posttest. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of 
argumentation change score for each group.  
Table 2.  
Argumentation Change Score by Condition (Posttest - Pretest). 
Condition N M SD 
Elaborative Interrogation 38 .39 1.05 
Summary Control 39 -.21 1.15 
No-Processing Control 40 -.28 .85 
Note: N = 117. 
Next, a one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the argumentation change 
score across the three groups. The experimental conditions (EI, summary, no-processing) 
were used as the independent variable or factor in the analysis, with argumentation 
change score as the dependent variable. It was found the three groups differed 
significantly on how much their argumentation quality improved or deteriorated from 
pretest to posttest [F (2, 114) = 4.99, p = .01, ƞ2 = .08]. Also, it can be seen from Table 2 
the EI group was the only group for which the argumentation quality increased after the 
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experimental manipulation, as indicated by a positive argumentation change score. Both 
the summary-control group and the no-processing control group showed deterioration in 
argumentation quality as indicated by negative argumentation change scores. The 
between-group difference was significant and showed medium to large effect size, as 
indicated by an ƞ2 value of 0.08.  
In order to further explore the source of the general between-group difference in 
argumentation change score, post hoc pairwise between-group comparisons were 
conducted. Results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3.  
Pairwise Between-Group Comparisons of the Argumentation Change Scores. 
Condition A - Condition B Mean Difference p value 
Elaborative Interrogation - Summary .60 .01 
Elaborative Interrogation - No Processing .67 .01 
Summary - No Processing .07 .76 
Note: N = 117. 
 As can be seen in Table 3, the EI treatment group had significantly higher 
argumentation change scores than both control groups. However, the two control groups 
did not show any significant difference on the argumentation change score.  Figure 2 
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Figure 2. Means of Argumentation Change (Posttest minus Pretest) Scores with Standard 
Errors by Condition. 
 
In sum, as can be seen in mean changes in argumentation presented above, 
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed; the treatment group did in fact show greater gain in 
argumentation score after answering the adapted elaborative question during reading as 
compared with the summary-control group and the no-processing control group, for 
whom the argumentation score dropped after the experimental manipulation.  
Hypothesis 2 
According to Hypothesis 2, participants in the treatment group were expected to 
demonstrate a more balanced belief after the experimental manipulation, whereas those in 
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the control groups would not demonstrate such pattern of belief change. To test 
Hypothesis 2, change variables were computed to reflect the within-subject difference of 
pretest and posttest belief scores as measured by the Educational Topic Belief Scale. 
Since there was a pro-CCSS-M (pro-CC) factor and an anti-CCSS-M (anti-CC) factor, a 
change variable was calculated for each of the belief factors by posttest belief item 
average score on the factor minus pretest belief item average score on the same factor. 
This means for EI participants, those who took a pro-CC position at pretest should have a 
negative pro-CC belief change score (pro-CC belief decreases after the experimental 
manipulation) and a positive anti-CC belief change score (anti-CC belief increases after 
the experimental manipulation). In the same sense, EI participants who took an anti-CC 
position at pretest should demonstrate an opposite pattern in the belief change score, 
namely a positive pro-CC belief change score and a negative anti-CC belief change. By 
contrast, participants in the control groups would not demonstrate such a pattern on their 
belief change scores. Table 4 and Table 5 present the means and standard deviations of 
the belief change scores for participants in the three groups, providing the basis for an 
exploration of the general pattern in the actual data.  
Table 4.  
Belief Change Score for Participants with a Pretest Pro-Common Core Position (N = 49). 




Condition N M SD M SD 
Elaborative Interrogation 18 -.20 .46 .29  .63 
Summary Control 16 .00 .69 -.48  .77 
No-Processing Control 15 .11 .60 -.10  .56 
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As can be seen in Table 4, the pattern of belief change in the EI group was 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2, with belief changes in the two control 
groups in the opposite direction. Therefore, the belief change score pattern in participants 
who took a pro-CC position at pretest is consistent with Hypothesis 2.   
Table 5.  
Belief Change Score for Participants with a Pretest Anti-Common Core Position (N = 67). 




Condition N M SD M SD 
Elaborative Interrogation 20 .34  1.07 -.02 .46 
Summary Control 23 .02  .68 .18 .39 
No-Processing Control 24 .17  .57 -.01 .61 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the pattern of belief change in EI group was 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2, with a pattern of belief change score in the 
two control groups in the opposite direction. Therefore, the belief change score pattern in 
participants who took an anti-CC position at pretest supported Hypothesis 2.  
In order to examine whether the above patterns were significant as an outcome of 
the experimental conditions and the pretest positions, further analysis was conducted. 
Since the two outcome variables were significantly and negatively correlated (ρ = -.216, 
p < .05), MANOVA was conducted on the data with experimental condition and pretest 
position as two between-subject independent variables, and the pro-CC and anti-CC 
belief score as two dependent variables.  
Results from the MANOVA showed the main effects were not significant for 
either independent variable. Specifically, for the experimental condition, p = .212, and 
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partial ƞ2 = .026. For the pretest position, p = .070, and partial ƞ2 = .048. However, the 
interaction effect between experimental condition and pretest position was significant, 
with p = .007, and partial ƞ2 = .062. Specifically, the test of between-subject effects 
showed the interaction effect was significant for the anti-CC belief change score, with p 
= .002, and partial ƞ2 = .109. This finding was consistent with the prediction of 
Hypothesis 2, since the value of belief change score should not solely depend on 
condition or solely depend on pretest position. For participants with a pro-CC pretest 
position, their pro-CC belief change score should be both negative and the lowest in the 
three groups. For participants with an anti-CC pretest position, in contrast, their pro-CC 
belief change score should be both positive and the highest in the three groups. Figure 3 
illustrates the means of pro-CC belief change score of each experimental group for each 
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Figure 3. Means of Pro-Common Core Belief Change Score by Condition and Pretest 
Position. 
 
For participants with a pro-CC pretest position, their anti-CC belief change score 
should be both positive and the highest in the three groups. For participants with an anti-
CC pretest position, their anti-CC belief change score should be both negative and the 
lowest in the three groups. Figure 4 presents the means of anti-CC belief change score of 
each experimental group for each pretest position, which was in consistency with the 
above predictions. 
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Figure 4. Means of Anti-Common Core Belief Change Score by Condition and Pretest 
Position. 
 
Therefore, based on the analyses results, the hypothesis—participants who 
responded to the adapted elaborative interrogation questions after reading each belief-
inconsistent argument did demonstrate more balanced topic beliefs after the treatment, 
whereas participants in the control groups did not show such pattern of belief change—
was confirmed. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 stated participants with higher need for cognition would demonstrate 
higher quality of argumentation overall and there would be an interaction between need 
for cognition and the treatment of adapted elaborative interrogation on improving quality 
of argumentation. To test Hypothesis 3, correlational analyses were conducted on the 
whole sample among four variables: need for cognition, pretest argumentation score, 
posttest argumentation score, and argumentation change score. Table 6 presents the 
results. 
Table 6.  
Correlation among Need for Cognition, Pretest Argumentation Score, Posttest 
Argumentation Score and Argumentation Change Score (Post Minus Pre) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. need for cognition -    
2. pretest argumentation score -.08 -   
3. posttest argumentation score -.08 .46*** -  
4. argumentation change score .02 -.51*** .53*** - 
M 3.23 2.89 2.83 -.03 
SD .57 1.02 1.02 1.06 
Note: N = 116. *** p < .001 
According to the results, need for cognition was not correlated with any of the 
three argumentation outcome variables. The only significant correlations existed among 
the pretest, posttest argumentation score, and the argument improvement score. To 
further examine whether this lack of correlation between need for cognition and the 
argumentation variables in the whole sample was a result of differentiated correlation due 
to the experimental manipulation (e.g. Participants in the treatment group may 
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demonstrate a stronger relationship between their need for cognition and argumentation 
scores as affected by the EI treatment), correlation analyses were also conducted 
respectively in the subsample of EI participants, the subsample of the summary-control 
participants, and the subsample of the no-processing- control participants. Tables 7, 8, 
and 9, respectively, show these results. 
Table 7.  
Correlation among Need for Cognition, Pretest Argumentation Score, Posttest 
Argumentation Score and Argumentation Change Score (Post Minus Pre) for EI 
Participants. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. need for cognition -    
2. pretest argumentation score -.06 -   
3. posttest argumentation score -.08 .42*** -  
4. argumentation change score -.02 -.60*** .48** - 
M 3.24 2.66 3.05 .39 
SD .60 1.02 .93 1.05 
Note: N = 38. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
Table 8.  
Correlation among Need for Cognition, Pretest Argumentation Score, Posttest 
Argumentation Score and Argumentation Change Score (Post Minus Pre) for Summary 
Control Participants. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. need for cognition -    
2. pretest argumentation score  -.13 -   
3. posttest argumentation score  -.04 .46** -  
4. argumentation change score   .08 -.56*** .48** - 
M 3.21 2.90 2.69 -.21 
SD .59 1.14 1.08 1.15 
Note: N = 39. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 9.  
Correlation among Need for Cognition, Pretest Argumentation Score, Posttest 
Argumentation Score and Argumentation Change Score (Post Minus Pre) for No-
Processing Control Participants. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. need for cognition -    
2. pretest argumentation score -.16 -   
3. posttest argumentation score -.14 .61*** -  
4. argumentation change score -.02 -.25 .62*** - 
M 3.23 3.03 2.75 -.28 
SD .53 .83 1.03 .85 
Note: N = 40. *** p < .001. 
It can be seen the results from the correlation analyses on the three subsamples 
showed similar pattern to the results from the whole sample, need for cognition was 
unrelated to any of the three argumentation scores. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was rejected 
according to these results.  
Additional Analyses 
Treatment Fidelity 
As previously described in Chapter 3, in order to provide additional information 
about the efficacy of the experimental treatment, a 10-point scale self-report question was 
included in the posttest measures for participants to rate the level of difficulty participants 
experienced during reading and question-answering (if any), with point 1 being 
“extremely easy” and point 10 being “extremely difficult”. The participants’ actual 
responses to this question ranged from 1 to 9, with a mean of 4.70 and a standard 
deviation of 1.82, indicating a perception of medium difficulty level on average. In order 
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to examine whether participants from different experimental conditions experiences 
differentiated level of difficulty to complete the experimental tasks, a one-way ANOVA 
was performed to compare their responses to this question across the three groups. The 
result showed the between-group differences was marginally significant (F = 2.684, p 
= .073). The results of pairwise comparisons between every two groups showed the EI 
participants reported significantly higher perceived difficulty level than participants in the 
no-processing control group (Mean Difference = .964, p = .022). In addition, the EI 
participants’ reported perceived difficulty level was also higher than the participants in 
the summary-control group (Mean Difference = .484), but this difference was not 
significant (p = .250).  
The above results thus generally indicate responding to EI questions indeed can 
lead to greater subjective difficulty as compared to not answering any questions, 
suggesting participants in the treatment group had exerted greater cognitive effort as a 
result of answering the EI questions. Further, the non-significant difference between the 
EI group and the summary-control group suggested answering the EI questions did not 
impose significantly greater cognitive load as compared to answering summary questions. 
Since the EI questions were designed to facilitate deep processing without overwhelming 
the participants by imposing too much cognitive load, such results validated  the design 
of the experimental materials had achieved its goal in the actual experiment. 
Presence of Rebuttal in Pretest versus Posttest Argumentation 
Since the EI questions were designed to help readers better process and 
understand belief-inconsistent arguments in order to develop rebuttals to these arguments, 
it was judged potentially informative to examine the proportion of participants who did 
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integrate rebuttal in their argumentation in both pretest and posttest. A between-group χ2 
test was conducted to examine whether the number of rebuttals differed across groups. 
The test was not significant. Table 10 presents the numbers and percentages of 
participants in each group who integrated rebuttals into their argumentation at pretest and 
at posttest. 
Table 10.  
Pretest and Posttest Comparisons of Occurrence of Rebuttals in Argumentation. 
Conditions N 
Pretest 
frequency Pretest % 
Posttest 
frequency Posttest % 
All participants  117 14 11.4% 42 34.1% 
Elaborative Interrogation    38   6 15.8% 14 36.8% 
Summary group    39   7 17.9% 11 28.2% 
No processing    40   1 2.5% 17 42.5% 
 
It can be seen from the results, in general, more participants included rebuttal to 
the opposing position in their argumentation in posttest than in pretest. This pattern was 
consistent across all experimental groups, which may suggest simply exposing 
participants to belief-inconsistent arguments had the effect of prompting participants to 
construct rebuttal to explicitly address arguments supporting positions opposing to their 
own. Also, such results suggested exposing writers to belief-inconsistent information may 
be an effective strategy to increase the awareness of opposing positions and the rationale 
of these position such that writers may be more likely to rebut to the opposing positions 
during the construction of argumentation.  
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Self-Reported Position Certainty and Topic Relevancy 
In both pretest and posttest, participants were asked to report how much they were 
certain their position was correct and to rate the degree to which the CCSS-M topic was 
relevant to them personally on a 5-point scale. Such information was judged to provide 
insights into the strength of participants’ prior beliefs, whether participants were 
motivated to engage with the topic in both reading and writing, as well as on the extent to 
which these two factors were correlated. Descriptive analysis showed most participants 
were quite certain about their position at both pretest (M = 3.76, SD = .830) and posttest 
(M = 3.73, SD = .967). Also, the CCSS-M topic was seen generally as quite relevant to 
most participants at both pretest (M = 3.93, SD = 1.179) and posttest (M = 3.97, SD = 
1.136). Both position certainty and topic relevancy stayed relatively stable from pretest to 
posttest. A further correlational analysis was then conducted on these variables, which is 
presented in Table 11. Responses from all 118 participants were included in the analysis 
since there was no missing data as relevant to the correlation analysis. 
Table 11.  
Correlation among Pre and Post Position Certainty and Topic Relevance. 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Pretest certainty -    
2. Pretest relevancy .31*** -   
3. Posttest certainty .30*** .17 -  
4. Posttest relevancy .24** .84*** .20* - 
M 3.76 3.93 3.73 3.97 
SD .83 1.18 .97 1.14 
Note: N = 118. * p < .05 level. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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As can be seen in Table 11, topic certainty and topic relevancy were positively 
correlated with each other at both pretest and posttest. For such results, one possible 
explanation is, participants who reported higher personal relevancy of the topic had 
learned more and thought more about the topic as well as their positions on it, such that 
they may have become quite certain the position they took was correct. Another possible 
explanation is, participants who reported higher topic relevancy held the truth of the topic 
more closely to their own identities such that it was important for them to report higher 
certainty about their topic position. However, since most of the participants were 
undergraduate students who had not been working as professionals in education for a 
long time, the identity-based explanation may not be as likely as the knowledge-based 
explanation. 
  




The overarching goal of this study was to examine the potential of using adaptive 
elaborative interrogation as a cognitive strategy and mechanism for combating cognitive 
biases, both in learning new information and demonstrating prior knowledge. The study’s 
specific purposes were threefold. First, this study examined whether an adapted 
elaborative interrogation treatment can be used as a remedy to confirmation bias by 
improving individuals’ ability to construct argumentation to defend their positions on a 
controversial topic, by helping create better understanding of belief-inconsistent 
arguments. Second, this study focused on testing whether adapted elaborative 
interrogation might help individuals develop less extreme and more balanced views on a 
controversial topic. Since such pattern of belief change can be seen as an indicator of 
attenuated confirmation bias, the second purpose was in line with the first one that 
examines the potential of elaborative interrogation to be used as a remedy of 
confirmation bias. Third, this study had the goal of exploring the impact of cognitive 
motivation, namely need for cognition, on quality of argumentation, as well as examining 
possible interactions between individuals’ need for cognition and the elaborative 
interrogation treatment. 
A randomized experiment with pre-test and post-test measures was conducted to 
test the research hypotheses. All participants were randomly assigned to either a 
treatment (adapted elaborative interrogation) condition, a summary-control condition, or 
a no-processing control condition. All participants also reported their positions on the 
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controversial topic of whether CCSS-M should be adopted in the state and wrote up 
argumentation at both pre-test and post-test to justify their positions. After pre-test and 
prior to post-test, all participants were exposed to six arguments opposing their pre-test 
topic positions, each designed to represent a simple claim-evidence/elaboration structure.  
A scoring rubric was developed by the researcher of the study to assess quality of 
argumentation on aspects relevant to the treatment. The improvement or deterioration in 
quality of argumentation was gauged by calculating the difference between post-test and 
pre-test argumentation scores based on the rubric.  
To measure beliefs about the CCSS-M topic, the researcher developed a scale 
based on the arguments used as reading materials of the experiment. Change in topic 
beliefs was assessed by calculating the difference between post-test and pre-test item-
average score on each of the two factors (pro-Common Core factor and anti-Common 
Core factor) of this beliefs scale. Finally, the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was used to measure participants’ need for 
cognition, with individuals’ average score on all items on this single factor scale used for 
data analysis.   
The experimental results confirmed Hypothesis 1 and 2, showing an elaborative 
interrogation treatment was effective both for improving quality of argumentation and 
attenuating extreme topic beliefs after reading belief-inconsistent arguments. Hypothesis 
3, however, was rejected, with no significant correlation found between need for 
cognition and quality of argumentation. There also was no interaction between the 
experimental conditions and need for cognition in terms of effects on quality of 
argumentation. 
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Comparisons to Previous Research 
Findings from this study are consistent with previous research findings on 
elaborative interrogation in general, in that elaborative interrogation was observed to 
improve understanding of belief-inconsistent arguments. Thus this study expands the 
research findings on the positive impact of elaborative interrogation on learning of 
arbitrary facts and inferential learning of well-established knowledge. Specifically, 
findings from the current study suggest elaborative interrogation can be used to facilitate 
balanced understanding of arguments reflecting different perspectives to improve 
construction of argumentation and form less extreme views on a controversial topic. In 
other words, this study has shown elaborative interrogation can help writers construct 
argumentations to justify their own position and attenuate their beliefs on an issue the 
truth of which is uncertain or unknown.  
This study differs from previous research on elaborative interrogation in that it 
suggests a new potential of this learning strategy—that of being useful as a remedy to 
certain cognitive biases. As indicated by post-test topic beliefs which were more balanced 
on average as compared to the pre-test beliefs in participants from the treatment group, as 
well as their improved argumentation, it can be argued  this study’s treatment can help 
attenuate confirmation bias. Given that the majority of participants retained their pre-test 
topic position, such results can be taken as meaning that individuals’ positions on the 
controversial topic may be supported by thinking that is more rational after the 
experiment than before. In this sense, this study suggests new perspectives on future 
research using elaborative interrogation as a cognitive strategy. To better articulate this 
new perspective, the remainder of this chapter provides discussion specific to findings on 
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each research hypothesis, the overall implications and limitation of this study, as well as 
suggestions for future research.   
Discussion of Hypothesis 1: Effects of Adapted Elaborative Interrogation on 
Argumentation Quality 
In light of the current experimental results, it can be seen the method of adaptive 
elaborative interrogation may have potential as an effective strategy for improving 
argumentation construction on controversial topics by combating confirmation bias 
against belief-inconsistent information. Adaptive elaborative interrogation’s potential as a 
confirmation-bias remedy can be analyzed from two cognitive perspectives. First, 
adaptive elaborative interrogation may improve learning of belief-inconsistent arguments. 
Second, by prompting more balanced and thorough memory search, adaptive elaborative 
interrogation may also enhance demonstration of the knowledge and skills needed to 
construct quality argumentation on a controversial topic.   
With regard to improved understanding of belief-inconsistent arguments, 
participants’ responses to the “why” questions of elaborative interrogation may provide a 
cognitive support for participants to identify and reflect on the relationship between 
claims and evidence/reasons in belief-inconsistent arguments. As shown by their 
improved argumentation scores, participants in the treatment group were more likely to 
come up with better elaboration and to include rebuttals in their argumentation. These 
findings would seem to strongly suggest the process of answering “why” questions may 
have two separate types of cognitive effects.  
The first type may be based on the increased chance for participants in the 
treatment group to examine the elaboration contained in each belief-inconsistent 
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argument just as they were trying to justify the logic tying a claim to its evidence/reason. 
Such processes seem likely to increase participants’ chances to examine their own 
elaborations when writing argumentation justifying their post-test topic position. This 
may have led to improved articulation of evidence relevant to the claim, as demonstrated 
by the improved quality of argumentation. In addition, since the elaborative interrogation 
treatment used in this study involved a “why” question on the relation between each 
belief-inconsistent argument and the topic position it purported to support, participants in 
the treatment group also may have had an increased chance to contemplate which 
arguments most effectively supported their own topic positions. This process may have 
contributed to increasing the relevance of their own arguments as justification of their 
topic positions, which was measured by the scoring rubric used.  
The second positive effect of elaborative interrogation on cognition may be due to 
increased awareness of belief-inconsistent arguments. For participants in the treatment 
group, being prompted to deeply reflect on the belief-inconsistent arguments may have 
made it less likely for these participants to ignore or distort the real meanings of these 
arguments as compared to participants in the control groups. Also, exerting mental effort 
to justify the relationship between the claim and evidence/reasons in a belief-inconsistent 
argument may also decrease the chance of shallow processing of belief-inconsistent 
arguments. As can be seen from the additional analysis in Chapter 4, greater pre-post 
increase of rebuttals was found in argumentations constructed by the treatment group, as 
compared with the summary-control group. It also should be noted  it is possible simply 
exposing individuals to belief-inconsistent arguments may increase the chance of rebuttal 
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integration in argumentation construction, as suggested by the large increase of number 
of rebuttals from pretest to posttest in the no-processing control group.  
In sum, it would seem the positive effect of adapted elaborative interrogation on 
improving quality of argumentation can be at least partially attributed to its effect on 
improving the learning of belief-inconsistent arguments. It also might be further argued, 
however, such effects may partially be the product of improved memory search tied to 
the treatment facilitating demonstration of topic understanding. As described in Chapter 2, 
confirmation bias not only leads to shallow processing of external information, but also 
can result in superficial examination and retrieval of existing memory content. When 
participants were answering the elaborative interrogation questions, however, it may have 
become more likely for them to create a mental simulation to account for the plausibility 
of belief-inconsistent arguments. Such mental simulation could have facilitated more 
balanced and extensive memory search on both sides of the issue, thus contributing to the 
depth and sufficiency of argumentation constructed.  
Discussion of Hypothesis 2: Effects of Adapted Elaborative Interrogation on Topic 
Beliefs 
The effect of elaborative interrogation of attenuating confirmation bias is also 
indicated by findings related to Hypothesis 2, which posited  participants in the adapted 
elaborative interrogation treatment group were expected to report more balanced and less 
extreme topic beliefs after the experimental manipulation. For both the pro-Common 
Core position and anti-Common Core positions, participants in the treatment group 
reported more balanced and less extreme topic beliefs after the experiment. By contrast, 
control group participants reported less balanced, more extreme topic beliefs. Such 
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findings would seem to provide intriguing evidence that elaborative interrogation might 
be used as a remedy to confirmation bias, and mechanisms underlying such effects may 
be similar to those underlying its positive effects on improving argumentation quality.   
First, the mental simulation possibly activated by answering “why” questions may 
have provided an opportunity for participants to reflect on the plausibility of beliefs 
opposing their own view. Second, the treatment also may have made information 
favoring beliefs opposing participants’ own views more available during the enhanced 
memory search. Third, the treatment seems likely to have facilitated deeper processing 
and thus made the opposing beliefs more understandable to participants, which together 
may have led to less extreme topic views even as they still retained their previous topic 
positions. In general, rational beliefs should be based on sufficient evidence/reasons, 
sound logic, and deep thinking on both sides of the issue. Therefore, as a result of 
attenuated confirmation bias, more balanced and non-extreme beliefs can be seen as 
flexible and adaptive, since such beliefs should be more likely to be open to future 
evidence, discussion, and environmental change.  
Designs for Adapting Elaborative Interrogation 
Based on this study’s findings and above discussions regarding the confirmation 
of Hypothesis 1 and 2, it would seem the adaptive elaborative interrogation strategy 
tested in the current research might have broader impacts on quality of argumentation and 
topic beliefs. Basically, the adaptive elaborative interrogation in this study had two 
features that interventions in previous elaborative interrogation studies did not, which 
may have supported argumentation construction by increasing awareness of how 
argumentation actually was constructed on a controversial topic. 
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A first key feature of the current manipulation was including a facilitative 
question at the very beginning, one designed to serve as a prompt for separate 
identification of claim versus evidence/reason. This feature is important because, in order 
to examine the relationship between claim and evidence/reason, one must first establish a 
clear distinction between these two things. Only after a claim is identified as independent 
from the evidence/reason, does it become possible to examine the quality of each 
independently, as well as the relationship between them. Thus, including a prompt 
question asking participants to distinguish between claim and evidence/reason for each 
belief-inconsistent argument prior to presenting the “why” question may have contributed 
to the effectiveness of the treatment. 
A second likely important feature was including “why” questions at two different 
levels of abstraction with regard to the belief-inconsistent reading materials. The first 
“why” question prompted reflections on the relationship between the claim and 
evidence/reason of each individual belief-inconsistent argument, while the second 
prompted reflections on the relationship between each belief-inconsistent argument and 
the topic position supported by it. A structure combining both lower- and higher-order 
relationships may be seen as closely resembling the actual structure of argumentation 
construction, which involves both constructing claims supporting the topic position and 
providing evidence/reasons bearing on the validity of the claims.  
By providing cognitive support specific to the reading materials and experimental 
task, the design of adapted elaborative interrogation in this study may also have 
addressed the high cognitive load issue, which often is a negative side effect of the 
“consider the opposite” approach (Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). The 
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“consider the opposite” approach typically asks participants to generate possible 
rationales for the position opposing their views without providing any cognitive support. 
Therefore, as a result of confirmation bias, participants may find it difficult to generate 
anything at all to support a view they disagree with, leading to an experience of high 
cognitive load. 
By contrast, the above two features of the adapted elaborative interrogation may 
have facilitated understanding of each individual belief-inconsistent argument and how it 
related to the topic position it supported. In aggregate, participants in this study reported 
lower than medium perceived difficulty of completing the experimental task (mean of 4.7 
on a 10-point scale), which indicates participants in general did not experience much 
cognitive overload. In addition, as discussed by Greene et al. (1996), materials already 
containing some elaboration may not be appropriate to examine the effect of elaborative 
interrogation. Since exposing participants to belief-inconsistent arguments only did not 
give them access to the elaboration on their own topic positions, this research design may 
have been particularly suitable for observing the effects of elaborative interrogation as a 
cognitive strategy to improve quality of argumentation.  
Discussion of Hypothesis 3: Effects of Need for Cognition on Argumentation Quality 
Hypothesis 3, which proposed a relationship between need for cognition and 
quality of argument, was rejected. No significant relationship was found. There may be 
several reasons for this negative finding. First, other factors than need for cognition may 
have stronger impact on quality of argumentation in the context specific to this study. For 
instance, since need for cognition is conceptualized as an overarching cognitive 
motivation for individuals to engage in challenging cognitive activities generally, it 
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seems plausible there might be context-specific motivational factors which could 
overwrite a general need for cognition. For example, participants may have a strong 
motivation to defend their pre-existing topic positions regarding whether CCSS-M should 
be adopted in the state, which may have attenuated or negated the general effect of need 
for cognition. Also, if some participants were very certain about their topic positions, 
they may have been strongly motivated to defend their topic position, regardless of their 
level of need for cognition. Such speculation seems credible given that most participants 
reported above-average (mean of 3.9 on a 5-point scale) self-relevancy of the CCSS-M 
topic, which might indicate some context-specific motivation to defend their position. 
They also in aggregate reported above-average (above 3.7 on a 5-point scale) certainty 
about their topic positions.  
However, since context-specific motivation was not measured in the current study, 
it can only be concluded  further research with a measure of context-specific motivation 
is needed to provide more direct evidence for the speculation that effects of context-
specific motivation may overwrite that of need for cognition as a general cognition 
motivation. Likewise, participants’ prior knowledge on the CCSS-M topic and their 
argumentation writing skills may be additional factors which had a strong impact on 
argumentation quality, which may also be speculated to overwrite the impact of need for 
cognition. Thus, future studies are needed to examine and compare effects of these 
factors on quality of argumentation to confirm or reject these speculations.  
Finally, it is also possible in order for the effects of need for cognition on learning 
outcome to be observed, the time spent on learning needs to be extended well beyond the 
time allocated in the current experimental sessions. Since need for cognition reflects an 
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individual’s general tendency to engage in cognitively challenging activities in all 
contexts, its effects presumably would be more likely to appear in a longer-term 
intervention involving multiple encounters with the learning materials, rather than in a 
study involving a single, relatively short learning session. That is, during a long-term 
learning process, the contexts of learning are likely to vary from one time to another, with 
need for cognition less easily overwritten or attenuated by the changing contextual factors 
and thus more readily observable.  
Contributions 
As compared to previous studies on elaborative interrogation, this study arguably 
can be seen as making two important contributions. First, this study has provided a new 
research paradigm for examining the usefulness of elaborative interrogation as a remedy 
to certain cognitive biases. Whereas prior research on elaborative interrogation has 
focused almost exclusively on examining its usefulness as a learning strategy for arbitrary 
facts or higher-order learning based on external input, this study has provided a new 
perspective for viewing elaborative interrogation as a potential mechanism for facilitating 
cognitive transformation. As previously discussed, an elaborative interrogation approach 
may affect both the approach to processing new information and how one searches 
existing memory content, resulting both in better understanding and improved 
demonstration of knowing in argumentation construction.  
Second, by providing relatively simple adaptations of the elaborative interrogation 
questions commonly used in previous studies, this study provides an initial response to 
the issues of high cognitive load or material of high difficulty level which have been 
considered undesirable for elaborative interrogation to positively affect learning (Clinton, 
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Alibali, & Nathan, 2016). Thus, adaptations of elaborative interrogation may provide a 
new way for future research on this cognitive strategy to address the issue of negative 
side effects on learning outcome, such as high cognitive load, suggesting the probability 
to have the positive effects of using cognitive strategy more like to be found by adaptive 
the strategy appropriately. 
A further potential of the current research comes from connecting educational 
research on learning strategies to the psychological research on cognitive bias. Given the 
positive findings of the present study, it seems elaborative interrogation may have 
potential as a cognitive remedy to confirmation bias, as indicated by the desirable belief 
change observed in participants from the treatment group. Admittedly, considerable 
additional research is needed in a variety of topics and contexts to test the utility of 
elaborative interrogation for correcting confirmation bias, but results of the current study 
do suggest possible productive adaptations of an intervention originally designed to 
improve informational learning.  Moreover, the current study proposed and 
experimentally tested the usefulness of elaborative interrogation to be used as a pedagogy 
for improving argumentation writing. Since the design and administration of elaborative 
interrogation questions can be easily adapted to different learning materials or writing 
topics, there likely is considerable potential for a practical use of elaborative interrogation 
for writing intervention in a variety of educational settings. 
Limitations 
The current study has several limitations to be addressed in future research. First, 
participants of this study were mostly education majors at a large public university. Since 
the controversial topic used in this study was an education topic, the participants seem 
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likely to have had greater background knowledge and interest in the content of the topic 
than other students in this age range. Individuals with a different major likely would have 
less prior knowledge and personal interest on this topic, which may result in different 
effect of the treatment if the same materials are used. Thus, findings from this study 
should be replicated in future studies involving participants with more varied 
backgrounds to strengthen the external validity of the research findings. 
Second, reading materials used in this study consisted of multiple belief-
inconsistent arguments, which may have provided information on too many dimensions. 
Although each argument was designed to possess a simplified structure of a claim 
followed by some evidence/reason to justify that claim, the reading material still 
contained several arguments with different claims and evidence/reasons. Reading 
materials with this design plausibly could make it difficult for participants to focus on 
one single point to develop sufficient elaboration and rebuttal in their own argumentation 
construction. Although the present findings showed positive effects of the treatment, 
whether such materials affected the internal validity of the results remains to be examined 
by future research. 
Future Research 
A logical next step for the current research is to examine the effect of elaborative 
interrogation on argumentation writing with reading materials focused on new topics and 
varying in length and complexity. As suggested by Dornisch and Sperling (2006), for 
instance, when individuals are reading longer text, elaborative interrogation may not be 
effective in facilitating information selection from the text. Also, the effect of elaborative 
interrogation may not be observed if the information to be learned is derived from 
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multiple sources (Dornisch & Sperling, 2008). Future research might also present a single 
argument in the reading material, in contrast to the multiple arguments present in the 
current study. Also, since individuals with higher prior knowledge are especially likely to 
benefit from elaborative interrogation (Ozgungor & Guthrie, 2004), further research on 
this topic should incorporate some measure of participants’ level of topic knowledge. 
Further, it may be profitable to provide standardized prior knowledge training and 
activation, such as learning or review sessions on topic information prior to experimental 
manipulation. 
It may also be productive in future research to have participants engage in more 
extensive writing on a longer period of time, which may provide conditions needed for 
the development of elaboration and demonstration of deep understanding in more 
extensive argumentation writing.  In addition, future research on using elaborative 
interrogation as an argumentation writing intervention can also integrate social argument, 
such as debate between participants taking opposing positions, to examine the effect of 
elaborative interrogation on argumentation constructed in the course of a conversation.  
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APPENDIX A: Math Common Core Arguments 
Pro-Common Core Arguments 
Please read each of the following arguments carefully and respond to questions that 
follow. You can come back and read these arguments again while you are working on the 
questions. 
 
Argument 1: Adopting Common Core will improve Nebraska’s students' 
mathematics achievement, while local control of educational standards is not working. 
The disconnect between Nebraska’s 8th grade mathematics NAEP (National Assessment 
of Educational Progress) results and Nebraska’s STARS (School-based Teacher-led 
Assessment and Reporting System) reported proportion of proficient students over the 
last decade is strong evidence local control does not increase math achievement. The 
proportion of 8th grade students reported as mathematically proficient, according to 
STARS, has grown from 72.34% in 2001-2002 to 91.58% in 2009-2010. However, 
NAEP scores over the same span of years remained virtually stagnant, hovering with plus 
or minus four points of 280.  
Argument 2: A common standard can create a greater ability for collaboration 
among educators in creating and revising high quality, content rich lesson plans that can 
be shared nation-wide. Collaboration on this scale would allow for a repository of 
materials to be gathered and shared by educators in all content strands. Textbooks would 
be created and aligned with a common set of standards in mind, allowing for a more 
cohesive use of publisher-based materials than many districts currently have in place. 
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Argument 3: Transitioning to the Common Core can be seen as an opportunity for 
federal and state educational dollars to work more efficiently. Focusing these separate 
funds on a single common goal would eliminate millions of educational dollars being 
spent by individual states to create standards and curriculum that changes each decade 
when the impact on student achievement is less than expected. This would allow states to 
invest more money at the classroom level where it is direly needed. The financial 
implications of a national curriculum appear to weigh in favor of individual learning. 
Argument 4: Adopting the Common Core has the benefit of an increased effort to 
help close the achievement gap for students with high mobility rates. Those students who 
move around throughout their educational career, whether they be military families that 
move across states or even countries, or students who move across town from one school 
to another within the same district, often develop gaps in their knowledge. This is, at least 
in part, due to the fact that the curriculum is not the same in all states, and is often not 
presented at the same grade level or same time of year in every school. When students 
move, material that had yet to be covered at their former school may have already been 
taught in their new school, or may not even be introduced at the same grade level. The 
Common Core can directly address such an issue. 
Argument 5: Having the same standards nationwide would potentially contribute 
to teacher education at the college level. Teaching common standards across the country 
would allow universities to better prepare pre-service teachers in the specific 
mathematical content they need to know, and ensure that what they are learning is 
relevant to what they will need to know in the classroom. For those teachers who attend 
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college in a different district or state than they end up teaching, this would be a very 
valuable change in the higher educational system for them. 
Argument 6: Adopting national standards assures that students all have the same 
opportunities when applying for college scholarships or jobs. A national curriculum 
would provide clear expectations for what teachers should be teaching, so we no longer 
have to be concerned of teachers teaching what they like, and leaving out things that they 
do not. To quote another proponent of national standards "this is the UNITED states of 
America. So, let's unite our standards and licensures for a better education for our 
students." 
Anti-Common Core Arguments 
Please read each of the following arguments carefully and respond to questions that 
follow. You can come back and read these arguments again while you are working on the 
questions. 
 
Argument 1: Adopting a national standard will undermine diversity that is at the 
very heart of the United States. We are a country made up of people from diverse 
backgrounds with diverse needs.  Our diversity is our strength. By adopting a national 
curriculum, we stand against that diversity by mandating that all student needs can be met 
by the same curriculum. That is not to say the students in Massachusetts are any more or 
less capable than students in Nebraska, but the needs of those students are in fact 
different. As it has been shown in Nebraska, it is possible for a state to write 
comprehensive standards that address needs of all students at all levels. 
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Argument 2: If a national standard is adopted, not only will states lose one of their 
primary responsibilities, but teachers will be forced to add more and more topics to their 
already bloated courses.  As the focus turns to teaching to the new standards, all teachers 
will have no choice but to discard best practices in the name of completion of tasks. 
Teaching will go from an art to a check list. Already we can see the effect of this in 
Nebraska, which has adopted very effective standards. 
Argument 3: A change to a new national standard at this time would be a 
dereliction of fiscal responsibility to the citizens of the state. The state of Nebraska 
devoted a large amount of resources, both time and financial, to development of the 
current standards. These standards are high quality and targeted to address educational 
needs specific to this state. The cost of adopting new materials that correlate to the 
Common Core on the heels of investments in the last year purchased to meet the needs of 
the new Nebraska curriculum is ludicrous; neither school districts nor the state has the 
necessary funding available. 
Argument 4: We do not really need to use a national standard, since states are 
capable of coming up with their own standards, which their curriculum matches. Most of 
the classrooms in the country are using books very similar in scope and sequence. The 
state tests are written based on the standards of each state which should be pretty close to 
the same thing so the state tests currently being used are sufficient to examine the 
progress of schools nationwide. 
Argument 5: A national standard does not contribute to students’ equal 
achievements as it claims to. A national standard only address the issue of what to teach, 
with no answers to how to teach. A teacher with minimal understanding of how to teach 
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mathematics may provide a rather ordinary learning experience for students in her class. 
But if the skill set possessed by individual teachers related to the learning of mathematics 
is solid, the experience in their classrooms may be more dynamic and thus more effective 
for learners. Until the focus of mathematics reform takes a good, long, hard look at using 
best practice in the classroom, what standards are adopted will not facilitate the change 
needed to increase achievement. 
Argument 6: The lack of control over the evolution of the Common Core 
Standards can pose a high risk to education in Nebraska. The Common Core Standards 
are untested and there is no proof that adopting the Common Core will improve student 
learning at all. Since there is no the local control over the mechanism of revising and 
improving the Common Core Standards, the sudden change of replacing current state 
standards that we have long appreciated with the Common Core is something that we 
cannot risk.    
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APPENDIX B: Educational Topic Position and Rationale Questionnaire 
Pre-Test 
Please read the following information about an educational topic and respond to the 
questions that follow. 
The Common Core State Standards for Mathematics (referred to as “Math 
Common Core” below) is an education initiative in the United States that details what K-
12 students should know in mathematics at the end of each grade. The Math Common 
Core seeks to establish consistent mathematics education standards across the states. The 
Common Core has drawn support and criticism from political representatives, policy 
analysts, and educational commentators. Forty-four of the fifty U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted the Common Core. Nebraska is one of the 5 states not 
adopting it at a state level.  
In Nebraska, there has been a controversy over whether the Math Common Core 
should be adopted. People who support the Math Common Core believe it is better than 
the current state standard of Nebraska and adopting the Math Common Core would 
benefit students’ mathematics achievement, use of financial resources in mathematics 
education, educators’ collaboration, and teacher preparation. People who are against the 
Math Common Core believe adopting it would undermine educational diversity in 
mathematics, deprive Nebraska of control over its mathematics education, lead to a waste 
of state money, and have no contribution to students’ mathematics achievement.  
Please think about this issue and describe your position on it by responding to the 
following questions. Please make sure you take either a pro-Math Common Core or an 
anti-Math Common Core position (no neutral ground) and indicate how certain your 
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position is the right one to take. If you are not so sure about your position, rate the 
strength of your position accordingly. 
 Do you think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics?  (mark one) 
Yes, I think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics. 
No, I don’t think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics. 
 Please rate how certain you are that the position you hold on this topic is right, 
with 1 being “very uncertain” and 5 being “very certain” (mark one of the 
numbers below): 
 Please rate how relevant this topic is to you personally, with 1 being “highly 
irrelevant” and 5 being “highly relevant” (mark one of the numbers below): 
 
Now please think about the strongest point(s) you are best able to argue on to 
justify the position you just take on the topic “Should the state adopt the Common Core 
State Standards for Mathematics?”. Then please write down some arguments to make the 
point(s) for your position. Please write as extensively as you wish.  
Post-Test  
Please think about the arguments you just read and your responses to the 
questions on the arguments. Now please describe your position on this topic by 
responding to the following questions. Please make sure you take either a pro-Math 
Common Core or an anti-Math Common Core position (no neutral ground) and indicate 
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how certain you are that your position is the right one to take, as well as how personally 
relevant this topic is to you. If you are not so sure about your position, rate the certainty 
of your position accordingly. 
 Do you think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics? (mark one) 
Yes, I think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics. 
No, I don’t think Nebraska should adopt the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics. 
 Please rate how certain you are that the position you hold on this topic is right, 
with 1 being “very uncertain” and 5 being “very certain” (mark one of the 
numbers below): 
 Please rate how relevant this topic is to you personally, with 1 being “highly 
irrelevant” and 5 being “highly relevant” (mark one of the numbers below): 
 
Now please think about the strongest point(s) you are best able to argue on to 
justify your current position on the topic “Should the state adopt the Common Core State 
Standards for Mathematics?”. Then please write down some arguments to make the 
point(s) for your position. Please write as extensively as you wish.  
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APPENDIX C: Educational Topic Belief Scale 
Please rate how much you agree with the following claims, with 1 being “strongly 
disagree” and 6 being “strongly agree”. 
2. A common standard can create a greater ability for collaboration among educators in 
creating and revising high quality, content rich lesson plans that can be shared nation-
wide. (pro-Common Core) 
3. Having a national curriculum would be an opportunity for federal and state educational 
dollars to work more efficiently. (pro-Common Core) 
4.  Adopting the Common Core has the benefit of an increased effort to help close the 
achievement gap for students with high mobility rates. (pro-Common Core) 
5.  Having the same standards nationwide would potentially contribute to teacher 
education at the college level. (pro-Common Core) 
6.  Adopting national standards assures that students all have the same opportunities 
when applying for college scholarships or jobs. (pro-Common Core) 
7.  Adopting a national standard will undermine diversity that is at the very heart of the 
United States. (anti-Common Core) 
8.  If a national standard is adopted, not only will states lose one of their primary 
responsibilities, but teachers will be forced to add more and more topics to their already 
bloated courses. (anti-Common Core) 
9.  A change to a new national standard at this time would be a dereliction of fiscal 
responsibility to the citizens of the state. (anti-Common Core) 
10.  We do not really need to use a national standard, since states are capable of coming 
up with their own standards, which their curriculum matches. (anti-Common Core) 
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11.  A national standard does not contribute to students’ equal achievements as it claims 
to. (anti-Common Core) 
12.  The lack of control over the evolution of the Common Core Standards can pose a 
high risk to education in Nebraska. (anti-Common Core) 
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APPENDIX D: Need for Cognition Scale (Short Version) 
Please rate to what extent each of the following statement describes you on a five-point 
scale.  
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. * 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities. * 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to think 
in depth about something. * 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. * 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. * 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. * 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. * 
13. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
14. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
15. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
16. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
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17. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort. * 
18. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. 
* 
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APPENDIX E: Adapted Elaborative Interrogation Questions 
Please briefly identify the claim of Argument 1 (Argument 2/Argument 3/Argument 






Now, please think from the perspective of the person who wrote Argument 1 (Argument 
2/Argument 3/Argument 4/Argument 5/Argument 6) and explain: 
 






2) Why do you think Argument 1 (Argument 2/Argument 3/Argument 4/Argument 
5/Argument 6) justifies that the state should/should not adopt the Math Common Core? 
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APPENDIX F: Summary-Control Questions 
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APPENDIX G: Flowchart of Experiment Procedures 
 
Pretest:  
Need for Cognition Scale 
Education Topic Belief Scale 
Introduction to the Math Common Core Topic 
Taking position on the topic 
 Writing arguments to justify the position taken 
Experimental Manipulation: 
Random assignment to  
Reading 6 arguments inconsistent with the pre-test position 
 









Answering 3 adapted 
EI questions for each 
argument 
Summary Control: Answer 
summary and thought 







Education Topic Belief Scale 
Taking position on the topic 
 Writing arguments to justify the post-test position  
